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DATA-DRIVEN DISCRIMINATION AT WORK
PAULINE T. KIM*
ABSTRACT
A data revolution is transforming the workplace. Employers are
increasingly relying on algorithms to decide who gets interviewed,
hired, or promoted. Although data algorithms can help to avoid bi-
ased human decision-making, they also risk introducing new sources
of bias. Algorithms built on inaccurate, biased, or unrepresentative
data can produce outcomes biased along lines of race, sex, or other
protected characteristics. Data mining techniques may cause em-
ployment decisions to be based on correlations rather than causal
relationships; they may obscure the basis on which employment
decisions are made; and they may further exacerbate inequality
because error detection is limited and feedback effects compound the
bias. Given these risks, I argue for a legal response to classification
bias—a term that describes the use of classification schemes, such as
data algorithms, to sort or score workers in ways that worsen
inequality or disadvantage along the lines of race, sex, or other
protected characteristics. 
Addressing classification bias requires fundamentally rethinking
antidiscrimination doctrine. When decision-making algorithms pro-
duce biased outcomes, they may seem to resemble familiar disparate
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impact cases; however, mechanical application of existing doctrine
will fail to address the real sources of bias when discrimination is
data-driven. A close reading of the statutory text suggests that Title
VII directly prohibits classification bias. Framing the problem in
terms of classification bias leads to some quite different conclusions
about how to apply the antidiscrimination norm to algorithms, sug-
gesting both the possibilities and limits of Title VII’s liability-focused
model.
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INTRODUCTION
The data revolution has come to the workplace. Just as the
analysis of large datasets has transformed the businesses of base-
ball, advertising, medical care, and policing, it is radically altering
how employers manage their workforces. Employers are increas-
ingly relying on data analytic tools to make personnel decisions,
thereby affecting who gets interviewed, hired, or promoted.1 Using
highly granular data about workers’ behavior both on and off the
job, entrepreneurs are building models that they claim can predict
future job performance.2 Sometimes called workforce or people
analytics, these technologies aim to help employers recruit talented
workers, screen for eligible candidates in an applicant pool, and
predict an individual’s likelihood of success at a particular job.3
Proponents of the new data science claim that it will not only help
employers make better decisions faster, but that it is fairer as well
because it can replace biased human decision makers with “neutral”
data.4 However, as many scholars have pointed out, data are not
neutral, and algorithms can discriminate.5 Large datasets often
1. See, e.g., George Anders, Who Should You Hire? LinkedIn Says: Try Our Algorithm,
FORBES (Apr. 10, 2013, 4:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeanders/2013/04/10/who-
should-you-hire-linkedin-says-try-our-algorithm [https://perma.cc/M7NF-SJJD]; Jeanne
Meister, 2014: The Year Social HR Matters, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/jeannemeister/2014/01/06/2014-the-year-social-hr-matters/ [https://perma.cc/
L6SJ-VMJE]; Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?, N.Y. TIMES:
THEUPSHOT (June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-
hire-better-than-a-human.html [https://perma.cc/PKM6-4JY4].
2. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Big Data, Trying to Build Better Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/technology/big-data-trying-to-build-better-workers.
html [https://perma.cc/3X99-EM4X].
3. See Josh Bersin, Big Data in Human Resources: Talent Analytics (People Analytics)
Comes of Age, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2013/
02/17/bigdata-in-human-resources-talent-analytics-comes-of-age/ [https://perma.cc/W69F-
3BAM].
4. See, e.g., id. (discussing workforce analytics as the superior alternative to employment
decisions “made on gut feel”); Lohr, supra note 2 (examining views of many proponents of
workforce analytics).
5. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Essay, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674 (2016); danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data:
Provocations for a Cultural Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. &
SOC’Y 662, 666-68 (2012); Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not
Fair, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 35 (2013); Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas,
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contain errors in individual records, and these errors may not be
randomly distributed. Algorithms that are built on inaccurate, bi-
ased, or unrepresentative data can in turn produce outcomes biased
along lines of race, sex, or other protected characteristics. When
these automated decisions are used to control access to employment
opportunities, the results may look very similar to the systematic
patterns of disadvantage that motivated antidiscrimination laws.
What is novel is that the discriminatory effects are data-driven.
Of course, employers have always done things such as recruiting,
hiring, evaluating, promoting, and terminating employees, but data
models do not rely on traditional indicia like formal education or on-
the-job experience. Instead, they exploit the information in large
datasets containing thousands of bits of information about individ-
ual attributes and behaviors. Third-party aggregators harvest
information from the internet about job applicants, including
detailed information about their social networking habits—how
many contacts they have, who those contacts are, how often they
post messages, who follows them, and what they like.6 Similarly,
monitoring devices collect data on the workplace behaviors of cur-
rent employees, recording information such as where they go during
the day, how often they speak with others and for how long, and
who initiates the conversation and who terminates it.7 Employers
can also obtain information about their employees’ off-duty behav-
ior. As employees spend more of their personal time online, third
parties can collect information on those activities, aggregate it with
other data, and share it with employers.8 Growing participation in
wellness programs means that employees increasingly share
Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable
Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29-35), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2765268 [https://perma.cc/CL85-DUKK]; Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data,
FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/10/think-again-big-data/
[https://perma.cc/V9XM-MNJ6].
6. See Michael Fertik, Your Future Employer Is Watching You Online. You Should Be,
Too., HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 3, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/04/your-future-employer-is-watchi
[https://perma.cc/XZ58-D5DC]; Meister, supra note 1.
7. See Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-work/354681/ [https://perma.
cc/92WJ-6VUD].
8. See, e.g., Esther Kaplan, The Spy Who Fired Me: The Human Costs of Workplace Mon-
itoring, HARPER’S MAG., Mar. 2015, at 31-32, 35.
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information about their offline behaviors as well, reporting such
things as how often they exercise or what they eat.9 Data miners use
this information to make health-related predictions, such as wheth-
er an employee is pregnant or trying to conceive.10 Aggregating
these various data sources can produce a rich and highly detailed
profile of individual workers.11
This volume of information requires some form of automatic
processing. No human brain can keep in view all of the thousands
of data points about an individual. And so, algorithms are developed
to make sense of it all—to screen, score, and evaluate individual
workers for particular jobs. These algorithms are the tools of work-
force analytics. For example, a company called Gild offers a “smart
hiring platform” to help companies find “the right talent quicker.”12
Gild uses an algorithm that 
crunches thousands of bits of information in calculating around
300 larger variables about an individual: the sites where a
person hangs out; the types of language, positive or negative,
that he or she uses to describe technology of various kinds; self-
reported skills on LinkedIn; [and] the projects a person has
worked on, and for how long
as well as traditional criteria such as education and college major.13
Other services screen large pools of applicants, automating the
9. See generally Jay Hancock, Workplace Wellness Programs Put Employee Privacy at
Risk, CNN (Oct. 2, 2015, 12:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/28/health/workplace-
wellness-privacy-risk-exclusive/ [https://perma.cc/X9RY-X4VZ].
10. See Valentina Zarya, Employers Are Quietly Using Big Data to Track Employee Preg-
nancies, FORTUNE (Feb. 17, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/castlight-pregnancy-
data/ [https://perma.cc/MA3W-DDZQ].
11. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 7; Sanjeev & Sandeep Sardana, Big Data: It’s Not a
Buzzword, It’s a Movement, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
sanjeevsardana/2013/11/20/bigdata/ [https://perma.cc/PU97-VFA9].
12. Our Story, GILD, https://www.gild.com/company [https://perma.cc/Q8QF-RPGB]; see
Matt Richtel, How Big Data Is Playing Recruiter for Specialized Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/technology/how-big-data-is-playing-recruiter-
for-specialized-workers.html [https://perma.cc/XAF6-SKXC].
13. Richtel, supra note 12; see also Vivian Giang, Why New Hiring Algorithms Are More
Efficient—Even If They Filter Out Qualified Candidates, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 25, 2013, 10:51
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-its-ok-that-employers-filter-out-qualified-candid
ates-2013-10 [https://perma.cc/3XLE-GH6V] (describing how Bright.com uses “data and
algorithms to match candidates up with potential jobs and hiring managers with star
performers”).
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process of selecting the most promising candidates for employers.14
One company examines hundreds of variables about job seekers,
analyzes a firm’s past hiring practices, and then recommends only
those applicants it believes the employer will be interested in hiring.
Other firms are developing computer games that record thousands
of data points about how individuals play, such as what decisions
they make and how long they hesitate before deciding, in order to
uncover patterns that can identify successful employees.15 Employ-
ers can then use these tools to make hiring or promotion decisions.
The actual impact on employment opportunities is difficult to
document because information about how developers construct these
algorithms is considered proprietary, and personnel data is confi-
dential. Nevertheless, some publicly available examples suggest
there is reason for concern. One company seeking to identify which
employees would stay longer found that the distance between home
and the workplace is a strong predictor of job tenure.16 If a hiring
algorithm relied on that factor, it would likely have a racially
disproportionate impact, given that discrimination has shaped
residential patterns in many cities. Other studies involving internet
advertising illustrate how algorithms that learn from behavioral
patterns can discriminate. For example, Latanya Sweeney has
shown that Google searches for African American-associated names
produce more advertisements for criminal background checks than
searches for Caucasian-associated names, likely reflecting past
patterns in users’ search behavior.17 Amit Datta, Michael Carl
Tschantz, and Anupam Datta have demonstrated gender differences
in the delivery of online ads to jobseekers, with identified male
users “receiv[ing] more ads for a career coaching service that
promoted high pay jobs,” while female users received more generic
ads.18 Similarly, a field study by Anja Lambrecht and Catherine
14. See Miller, supra note 1.
15. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 7.
16. See Dustin Volz, Silicon Valley Thinks It Has the Answer to Its Diversity Problem,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/silicon-valley-
thinks-it-has-the-answer-to-its-diversity-problem/431334/ [https://perma.cc/VA6N-6W53].
17. See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, COMM. ACM, May 2013,
at 44, 46-47.
18. See Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz & Anupam Datta, Automated Experiments on
Ad Privacy Settings, PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS., Apr. 2015, at 92, 92-93; see also
Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Deirdre K. Mulligan & Michael Carl Tschantz, Discrimination
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Tucker revealed that an internet ad for STEM (science, technology,
engineering and math) jobs was far less likely to be shown to women
than men.19 These examples did not necessarily result from inten-
tional bias, but the discriminatory effects were nevertheless real.
While workforce analytics are transforming employers’ personnel
practices, the legal world has only just begun to take notice. Privacy
law scholars have raised concerns about the growth of big data,
asking what limits the law should place on the collection of particu-
larly sensitive personal information, or whether it should regulate
“data flows” or downstream uses of this information.20 Although
much of the focus has been on problems caused by inaccurate data
records or unexpected and invasive uses of sensitive personal
information,21 these scholars have also sounded alarms that big data
may produce biased outcomes. Of the handful of commenters who
have addressed the employment context, most have simply raised
questions about the discriminatory potential of data analytics,22
without deeply theorizing the nature of the harms that these
technologies threaten for workers. And to the extent that legal
scholars have considered how the law might respond, they have
confined their analysis to narrowly applying existing doctrine.23
in Online Personalization: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry 3-5 (Mar. 13, 2016) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with author) (describing experiment and analyzing possible legal response).
19. See Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study into
Apparent Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads 2, 10-12 (Oct. 13,
2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2852260 [https://perma.cc/3PGF-
CVTW].
20. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Essay, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4, 7-8, 18-22 (2014); Kate Crawford
& Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Pri-
vacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 94-96, 98-99, 101, 103-09, 123-27 (2014). See generally Neil
M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 409 (2014);
Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 20 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2655719 [https://perma.cc/58A8-SCZB].
21. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 20, at 4; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 20, at 96-
99.
22. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRE-
SERVING VALUES 51-53 (2014), https://perma.cc/LE9N-PA9D; Citron & Pasquale, supra note
20, at 4; danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Six Provocations for Big Data (Sept. 21, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1926431 [https://perma. cc/3JUG-FAFJ];
Alex Rosenblat, Kate Wikelius, danah boyd, Seeta Peña Gangadhoran & Corrine Yu, Data &
Civil Rights: Employment Primer (Oct. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2541512 [https://perma.cc/398Q-F5MZ].
23. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 694-712 (applying existing Title VII doc-
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Workforce analytics pose an entirely new set of challenges to
equality that calls for fundamentally rethinking antidiscrimination
doctrine. Proponents of workforce analytics argue that data models
can avoid reliance on biased human decision-making.24 Skeptics
warn that data is not neutral and that workforce analytics threaten
to introduce new forms of bias or exacerbate existing ones.25 But
there is a third possibility as well—employers and researchers can
use data to diagnose where and how cognitive or structural biases
are currently operating in ways harmful to disadvantaged groups.
Thus, the impact of workforce analytics will depend to a large extent
on the choices that are made about how to deploy these technologies.
And those choices will be shaped in turn by the legal environment
in which firms operate.
The harms threatened by biased algorithms are not easily cap-
tured by traditional antidiscrimination law, which tends to focus on
a specific “bad actor” and individual victims. Of course, a prejudiced
employer might hide its discriminatory intent behind a biased data
model. Such a scenario poses no particular conceptual challenge,
although proof may be difficult as a practical matter. Even without
any deliberate intent, a model may be biased in the statistical sense.
Choices in the coding of information, errors in the data, reliance on
unrepresentative samples, or the selection of variables for exclusion
or inclusion might produce a model that is inaccurate in a system-
atic way.26 When those systematic errors coincide with protected
class status and operate to reduce opportunities for already
disadvantaged groups, it should trigger the same concerns about
workplace equality that motivated antidiscrimination laws. 
The nature of algorithmic decision-making raises particular
concern when employers rely on these models to make personnel
decisions. Data mining techniques used to build the algorithms seek
to uncover any statistical relationship between variables present in
the data, regardless of whether the reasons for the relationship are
understood. As a result, if employers rely on these models, they may
deny employees opportunities based on unexplained correlations
and make decisions that turn on factors with no clear causal
trine).
24. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 5.
26. See infra Part I.B.
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connection to effective job performance. Because of limited opportu-
nities for error correction, and the possibility of reinforcing feedback
effects, these models may not only introduce but actually worsen
bias and inequality. Given these risks, the law ought to be con-
cerned with what I call “classification bias.” Classification bias
occurs when employers rely on classification schemes, such as data
algorithms, to sort or score workers in ways that worsen inequality
or disadvantage along the lines of race, sex, or other protected
characteristics. 
Classification bias may seem amenable to challenge under
disparate impact doctrine, which targets facially neutral employ-
ment practices that have disparate effects on racial minorities or
other protected classes.27 However, a mechanical application of
existing disparate impact doctrine will fail to meet the particular
risks that workforce analytics pose. That doctrine evolved to address
employer use of tests purporting to measure workers’ abilities, and
therefore focused on the validity of those measures and their
relevance to a particular job.28 In contrast, data mining models do
not rest on psychological or any other theories of human behavior.
Instead, these models simply mine the available data, looking for
statistical correlations that connect seemingly unrelated variables,
such as patterns of social media behavior, with workplace perfor-
mance.29 As a result, they pose a different set of risks—risks that
existing doctrine does not address well. 
As an example, disparate impact doctrine provides a defense if an
employer can show that a test is “job related ... and consistent with
business necessity.”30 In the case of workforce analytics, the data
algorithm by definition relies on variables that are correlated in
some sense with the job. So to ask whether the model is “job related”
in the sense of “statistically correlated” is tautological. The more
important question in the context of data mining is what does the
correlation mean? Is the statistical relationship it uncovers causal,
such that it provides a reliable basis for predicting future behavior?
27. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
28. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701, 755-60 (2006).
29. See Fertik, supra note 6.
30. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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Or does it result from erroneously coded information, an unrepre-
sentative sample, omitted variable bias, or some other data prob-
lems? Because the risks to workplace equality posed by data mining
algorithms arise from different sources, existing disparate impact
doctrine will not be adequate to address the risks they pose.
Addressing the possibilities and risks of data analytics for
workplace equality requires taking a fresh look at antidiscrimina-
tion law, unencumbered by the specific doctrinal details that have
developed under Title VII. Revisiting the statutory text suggests
that Title VII directly prohibits classification bias. More specifically,
section 703(a)(2) forbids employer practices that “classify” employ-
ees or applicants “in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive” them of employment opportunities because of protected
class characteristics.31 By focusing on the consequences of employ-
ers’ classification schemes, this reading offers a more relevant frame
for addressing the challenges that workforce analytics pose.
Thinking about the problem in terms of classification bias leads
to some quite different conclusions about how the antidiscrimination
norm should apply to data models.32 For example, if the goal is to
discourage classification bias, then the law should not forbid the
inclusion of race, sex, or other sensitive information as variables,
but seek to preserve these variables, and perhaps even include them
in some complex models.33 Similarly, this perspective suggests that
those who use data mining models should bear the burden of
demonstrating the accuracy and representativeness of the data used
to construct the models, rather than requiring complainants to
identify the flaws giving rise to biased outcomes.34
Addressing the challenges of workforce analytics using a theory
of classification bias also reveals the limitations of the backward-
looking, liability-focused model of legal regulation embodied by Title
31. The full text of subsection (a)(2) reads: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
32. See infra Part III.C.
33. See infra Part III.C.1.
34. See infra Part III.C.3.
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VII.35 Because of the diffuse nature of the harms and the significant
resources that would be required to challenge biased algorithms, it
may be difficult to incentivize individual plaintiffs to enforce a pro-
hibition on classification bias. Even more problematic, a strong
liability regime intended to address the use of biased algorithms
may discourage employers from trying to understand whether these
tools have disparate effects or may discourage them from using
algorithms at all. If the law swings too far in this direction, it would
avoid the costs of biased algorithms but also eliminate any potential
positive effects that data analytics might have on diagnosing and
counteracting cognitive and structural biases already affecting
workplaces. Resolving this dilemma may require looking beyond
liability-focused legal models to alternatives such as ex ante regula-
tion, licensing models, or the development of technological solutions.
In considering the impact of data analytics on workplace equality
and the appropriate legal response, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part I surveys the psychological and structural factors that
contribute to bias in the contemporary workplace and considers the
potential for data models to eliminate that bias. Replacing human
decision makers with a computer algorithm may prevent certain
types of cognitive biases from operating but is unlikely to reach
other types of structural disadvantage that may result from the way
work is organized. At the same time, widespread reliance on
decision-making algorithms risks introducing new forms of bias or
exacerbating existing ones. Part I surveys those risks, catalogues
the types of harm that may result from reliance on algorithms in the
workplace, and then argues for recognizing classification bias as a
distinct type of threat to workplace equality.
Part II considers whether other responses—aside from antidis-
crimination law—can effectively address classification bias and
concludes that neither market forces nor traditional forms of privacy
protection are likely to be successful. The nature of labor markets
are such that employers will not reliably receive signals if their
employment practices produce bias against minority groups. And
privacy protections typically focus on individual harms rather than
addressing the group-based disadvantages that are the principal
concern of antidiscrimination law.
35. See infra Part III.E.
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In Part III, I consider the limits and possibilities of existing
antidiscrimination law. Mechanical application of existing Title VII
doctrine is unlikely to be successful in addressing the equality chal-
lenges that workforce analytics pose. Neither disparate treatment
nor current disparate impact doctrine completely captures the types
of risks threatened by data models. Instead, antidiscrimination law
should be adapted to meet these unique risks. Part III argues that
a close reading of the statutory text shows that Title VII does
prohibit classification bias, and considers what a robust response to
this form of discrimination should look like.
More specifically, it argues that an effective legal response will
depart from traditional disparate impact doctrine in several ways.
For example, employers should not be able to justify reliance on a
biased model merely by showing a statistical relationship but should
bear the burden of showing that the model is statistically valid and
substantively meaningful. At the same time, an employer should be
permitted to rely on a “bottom-line” defense if its use of a model as
part of a larger selection process does not produce discriminatory
results.
After considering how the law should respond, Part III briefly
explains why the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano
poses no obstacle to enforcing a prohibition on classification bias.
Finally, it considers the limitations of classification bias theory and
suggests some alternatives to a liability-based regime.
I. THE IMPACT OF DATA ANALYTICS ON WORKPLACE EQUALITY
A. The Promise of Workforce Analytics
The use of data analytics offers the potential to reduce bias in
employment. Proponents of the technology claim that algorithms do
just that by eliminating the subjective biases and personal predilec-
tions of a human resources manager. For example, the goal of Gild
is “to build machines that ... eliminate human bias.”36 Pointing to
the many ways in which human decision-making is biased, these
services offer to find overlooked talent that better matches a
company’s needs and, in turn, to produce a more diverse workforce.
36. See Richtel, supra note 12.
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These claims are consistent with scholarly accounts of how
human bias distorts personnel decisions, even in the absence of a
conscious discriminatory motive.37 Charles Lawrence argues that
unconscious prejudices may lead to discrimination even when the
decision maker is unaware of, and would disclaim, any prejudicial
intent.38 Similarly, Linda Krieger and other scholars explain how
ordinary cognitive processes naturally lead people to create mental
categories.39 When these categories coincide with race or gender
differences, they can distort the perceptions of supervisors and
managers in ways that tend to confirm societal biases. More recent-
ly, a great deal of attention has focused on implicit bias.40 Scholars
point to the results of the Implicit Associations Test to argue that
people typically associate negative characteristics more strongly
with disfavored groups.41 These negative associations can result in
adverse decisions for members of those groups, even when the
decision maker intends to act fairly and believes that she is doing
so.42
Although these theories differ as to the precise mechanism at
work, they are alike in pointing to processes that occur outside of
conscious awareness. They suggest that automatic processes—the
ways in which our brains naturally function—can produce biased
judgments. As a result, these effects are not readily visible to the
decision maker, even upon self-reflection.43 Individuals who strongly
embrace nondiscrimination and equality norms may be particularly
37. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-
87 (1995).
40. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and
Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2006); Anthony G.
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
945 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
969 (2006); Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism About Equal
Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627 (2015); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010).
41. For reviews of the social science literature on implicit bias, see Greenwald & Krieger,
supra note 40, at 951-58; Kang & Lane, supra note 40, at 473-81.
42. See, e.g., Kang & Lane, supra note 40, at 468-89.
43. See Lawrence, supra note 37, at 336-39; see also Krieger, supra note 39, at 1217. 
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resistant to recognizing the operation of bias in their mental pro-
cessing because of the cognitive dissonance that would result.44
The claim of workforce analytics is that algorithms can replace
fallible human judgments with neutral, unbiased data to improve
decision-making.45 The chief scientist at Gild put it this way: “Let’s
put everything in and let the data speak for itself.”46 The proponents
of data science are right to point out that traditional employment
practices—relying as they often do on subjective assessments, in-
tuition, and limited human cognition—may entail considerable
amounts of bias. However, as discussed in Part I.B below, algo-
rithms are not always neutral either. Depending on the choices
made in collecting and coding information and building models, data
analytics risk replicating existing biases or introducing new ones.47
So although algorithms offer the potential for avoiding or minimiz-
ing bias, the real question is how the biases they may introduce
compare with the human biases they avoid.
Whatever their promise for eliminating cognitive biases, algo-
rithms will not counteract structural forms of workplace bias. This
type of bias results not from cognitive processes but from structural
forces that shape opportunities differently for different types of
people. Numerous scholars have argued that workplaces are often
organized in ways that systematically disadvantage women or
minorities.48 For example, when training and advancement oppor-
tunities are informally distributed in a firm through social net-
works, women or racial minorities who have less extensive networks
may be disadvantaged. Similarly, work that requires long hours or
unpredictable schedules may place particular burdens on women,
who are often the primary caretakers of their children. These types
of choices about workplace organization may not reflect intent to
exclude, and, therefore, like the cognitive processes described above,
44. See Lawrence, supra note 37, at 337.
45. See Richtel, supra note 12.
46. Id. (quoting Vivienne Ming, chief scientist at Gild).
47. See supra note 5.
48. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrim-
ination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 91, 104 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 468-74 (2001).
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their impact on disadvantaged groups is not readily visible to
managers.49
Relying on data models instead of human decision-making is
unlikely to counter structural forms of bias because these models
take existing workplace structures as givens. For example, if re-
duced access to social networks in a firm hampers minority employ-
ees’ chances of promotion, relying on data to make those promotion
decisions will not remedy the fact that minority employees are
receiving less mentoring and training. Similarly, data-driven hiring
decisions will not alter the reality that unpredictable work sched-
ules will take a greater toll on workers with caregiving responsibili-
ties, who are more often women. Thus, merely relying on data
analytics instead of human judgments will not address forms of
disadvantage that result from biased workplace structures.
On the other hand, data can be a useful tool for diagnosing both
cognitive and structural forms of bias. Rather than using workforce
analytics to make decisions, firms could deploy close analysis of
employment-related data to assess the decision-making process
itself, thereby uncovering hidden biases and prompting efforts to
counteract them. One service, Textio, used language analysis to
determine that certain phrases in job postings—for example, mili-
tary analogies like “mission critical”—appear to reduce the propor-
tion of women who apply.50 Employers committed to recruiting a
diverse workforce might learn how to craft language likely to attract
a more diverse applicant pool from such a program. Cognitive
science teaches that individuals tend to remember facts that confirm
their preexisting beliefs about the world.51 Krieger and others
explain how this phenomenon might lead supervisors to remember
negative information about members of disfavored groups but to
disregard similar information about in-group members.52 Data could
be a useful corrective to such biased perceptions, highlighting for
managers when their recall about particular workers may be faulty.
Supervisors who are not themselves biased might nevertheless
fail to recognize how earlier discriminatory decisions continue to
shape current outcomes. An initial discriminatory decision that
49. See id. at 470-71.
50. See Miller, supra note 1.
51. See Krieger, supra note 39, at 1203.
52. See id. at 1209.
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created a pay differential between men and women can have effects
years later, even if every subsequent decision regarding individual
raises is entirely fair and neutral.53 A current supervisor, having
directly observed only unbiased decisions in recent years, might
view the differential in wages as justified. By decomposing the
factors contributing to current salary or by comparing salary to
discrete measures of productivity, data analysis might make visible
the current effects of past discrimination, rather than allowing those
outcomes to appear natural and inevitable.
Employers can also use data to identify sources of structural bias
that disadvantage certain groups. In the example cited in the intro-
duction, Evolv, the company that identified the distance between
home and the workplace as a predictor of employee job tenure,
decided not to use this factor in its hiring algorithm because it
understood that housing patterns are correlated with race and that
relying on that correlation might result in discrimination.54 In
addition to eliminating the factor as a basis for decision-making, an
employer might use the information to examine whether its work-
place practices make it more difficult for employees who travel long
distances to succeed. A firm committed to a diverse workforce but
located in a city with a segregated housing market might consider
policies like flex-time or benefits like public transit passes in order
to relieve a commuting burden that falls more heavily on already
disadvantaged groups.
Data analytics thus hold the potential to reduce biases and
increase opportunities in the workplace for traditionally disadvan-
taged groups. But much depends on how data are used. When
employers use analytics to evaluate personnel policies and proce-
dures, data can help to diagnose where workplace structures or
53. Consider, for example, the facts in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S.
618, 621-22 (2007). The plaintiff in that case, Lilly Ledbetter, worked for Goodyear Tire for
nearly twenty years. Id. at 621. She alleged that several supervisors had given her poor
evaluations because of her sex and that those discriminatory evaluations continued to result
in her receiving lower pay than her male counterparts throughout her employment with the
defendant. Id. at 622. The Supreme Court dismissed her claims on the grounds that no
discriminatory pay decisions had been made during the statutory “charging period”—the last
180 days before she filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. at 624-32.
Congress eventually overturned the decision in the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5-6 (2009) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)).
54. See Volz, supra note 16.
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organizations inadvertently disadvantage or exclude members of
certain groups. Relying on data analytics to sort applicants and
employees may also reduce bias if these models are less biased than
the subjective human decision makers they replace. Whether that
is the case, however, depends a great deal on how the algorithms
are constructed and deployed. As the next Section explores, there
are numerous reasons to be concerned that workplace analytics may
introduce bias or worsen existing patterns of disadvantage.
B. The Risks of Workforce Analytics
Although data analytic tools offer the potential for countering
biased decision-making processes and workplace structures, these
same tools also risk reinforcing existing discrimination or introduc-
ing new forms of bias. Employers have long used data to sort and
rank workers—for example, through preemployment tests, psycho-
logical screens, or productivity requirements. These traditional uses
of data metrics to measure and evaluate can raise concerns about
bias, and they have faced legal challenges.55 However, the new
workforce science poses distinct risks. With traditional forms of test-
ing, employers generally started by identifying skills or attributes
thought relevant to job performance and then relied on test profes-
sionals to develop measures of those skills or attributes. These
forms of testing collected limited amounts of targeted information
about applicants or employees. In contrast, data models today take
advantage of the vastly greater quantity of data available and mine
it to discover novel correlations. That data may contain information
about attributes or behaviors, such as social media usage, that have
no clear connection with job performance.
In order to build a model, its creators must select the data that
they will use to build it—the “training data.”56 The actual data min-
ing occurs when the data are analyzed using statistical techniques
55. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56. See Bart Custers, Data Dilemmas in the Information Society: Introduction and
Overview, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND
PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES 3, 3-4 (Bart Custers, Toon Calders, Bart Schermer & Tal
Zarsky eds., 2013).
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to uncover patterns.57 The data miner is not testing any particular
hypotheses or explanations; instead, the process reveals statistical
relationships among variables present in the data.58 What the data
miner finds thus depends on the data examined. The correlations
may be causal or the relationship may be entirely coincidental.59
Data mining is generally unconcerned with the reasons for the
correlation.60 So long as the relationships discovered are thought to
be robust, the data model may use them to classify or predict future
cases.61 So, for example, a data model might find that individuals
who “like” certain items on Facebook have higher intelligence.62
Data mining cannot explain this relationship, but a model may
nevertheless predict that applicants who share that characteristic
are better workers and recommend their selection over those who do
not.
In their article Big Data’s Disparate Impact, Solon Barocas and
Andrew Selbst provide a taxonomy of ways that the data mining
process can result in adverse impact on protected groups.63 One of
the first steps in building a model is identifying the target
variable—in other words, defining the outcome of interest64—and
defining which outcomes are desired by categorizing them.65 Doing
so in the employment context is not simple. Unlike credit card
charges, which can be categorized with complete certainty as
fraudulent or not, the category of “good employee” is not self-
57. See id. at 9 (“[T]he ... data-mining stage ... [occurs when] the data are analyzed in
order to find patterns or relations. This is done using mathematical algorithms.”).
58. See id. at 7 (explaining that data mining differs from traditional statistical analysis,
which begins with a hypothesis, because data mining generates hypotheses from the data
itself).
59. See id. at 16-17.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 16.
62. See, e.g., Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and
Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. 5802, 5805 (2013) (showing that records of an individual’s Facebook “likes” can be
used to accurately predict personal characteristics such as race, gender, sexual orientation,
religious and political views, and intelligence); see also Toon Calders & Indrë Žliobaitë, Why
Unbiased Computational Processes Can Lead to Discriminative Decision Procedures, in
DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 56, at 43, 45-47.
63. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 677-93.
64. See id. at 678.
65. This process is referred to as defining “class labels” for the target variable. See id. at
678-79.
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evident.66 In order to build a model, the meaning of “good employee”
must be specified in a way that the machine can understand, name-
ly “in ways that correspond to measurable outcomes: relatively
higher sales, shorter production time, or longer tenure, for exam-
ple.”67 Using a more holistic definition of “good” would require some-
one to create a measure that captures that quality and to apply it to
particular individuals in order for the machine to know what it is
looking for in future cases.68 
As Barocas and Selbst explain, this process of classifying
individuals risks reintroducing the human biases the data analysts
are seeking to avoid.69 If the data miner chooses to rely on only
“objective” measures for the target variable, this will introduce bias
of a different kind, by valuing quantifiable measures of performance
over softer skills like leadership or collaboration. In order to build
a predictive model, the data miner must label and classify the
training data—a “necessarily subjective process of translation”70—
and these choices may introduce biases against protected groups.71
The selection of the training data will affect the outcome of the
model as well. As Barocas and Selbst explain, “what a model learns
depends on the examples to which it has been exposed.”72 The
training data may incorporate biased judgments, as, for example,
when they include supervisors’ evaluations or previous hiring
decisions that were colored by prejudice or distorted by cognitive
bias.73 Because the model will accept those characterizations “as
ground truth,”74 it will inevitably reflect those biases in the out-
comes it produces. Factual errors may exist in the data as well, and
those errors may be more frequent for members of certain groups,
rendering the model less accurate when applied to members of those
groups.75 Another concern is that the data may be unrepresentative
in that different groups are not represented in proportion to their
66. See id. at 679.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 680.
70. Id. at 678.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 680.
73. See id. at 682.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 684; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 52.
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presence in the population.76 Big datasets, which often supply the
training data for workforce analytics, are more likely to exclude
members of minority groups and disadvantaged populations, those
“who live on big data’s margins ... and whose lives are less ‘datafied’
than the general population’s.”77 If the data collection process sys-
tematically captures less information about certain groups, then the
resulting decision-making algorithm may produce biased results.78
Barocas and Selbst offer the example of an employer that relies on
data about online expressions of interest to target its recruitment
efforts.79 Because of differences in access to broadband in different
communities, relying on such data may cause an employer to under-
estimate the level of interest and qualifications in underrepresented
communities. A recruiting strategy based on such data is likely to
produce biased outcomes.
Barocas and Selbst identify several other mechanisms by which
data models may produce biased outcomes. The process of “feature
selection”—choosing which attributes to include in the analy-
sis—can have “serious implications for the treatment of protected
classes.”80 If the attributes that explain variation within a protected
class are not incorporated, the model may be unable to distinguish
among members of the group, leading it to rely on broad generaliza-
tions that disadvantage individual members of the group.81 Data
models may also discriminate when neutral factors act as “proxies”
for sensitive characteristics like race or sex.82 Those neutral factors
may be highly correlated with membership in a protected class, and
also correlate with outcomes of interest.83 In such a situation, those
neutral factors may produce results that systematically disadvan-
tage protected groups, even though the model’s creators have no
discriminatory intent, and the sensitive characteristics have been
removed from the data.84 Finally, Barocas and Selbst point out that
76. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 684.
77. Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57 (2013);
see also Crawford, supra note 5.
78. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 684-86. 
79. Id. at 685.
80. Id. at 688.
81. See id. at 689-90.
82. See id. at 691-92.
83. See id. at 691.
84. See id.
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employers may use data models to intentionally discriminate
against certain groups. Because data mining can often infer pro-
tected class status from other neutral variables, employers could use
data analytics as cover for intentional discrimination.85
In addition to the mechanisms that Barocas and Selbst identify,
other characteristics of data models raise particular concerns when
employers rely on them to make personnel decisions. Contrasting
data mining techniques with traditional social science methodolo-
gies illuminates the problems. Social scientists articulate theories
about the world, develop hypotheses based on those theories, and
then subject those hypotheses to rigorous empirical testing, often by
using data.86 Their goal is to understand and explain patterns
observed in the world.87 An important part of designing an empirical
test is determining what population the data should be drawn from
and what variables should be included in the statistical model.88 The
theory motivating the study informs each of these decisions and
each decision is consequential for the accuracy of the results.89
Suppose a researcher has a theory that past military service
makes employees more successful in managerial positions. Testing
this hypothesis will require examining how military service and on-
the-job success are related using data about a representative group
of workers. Looking only at those two variables might suggest that
military service is negatively associated with future job perfor-
mance. But a social scientist would also want to include other
variables that could independently influence job performance.
Unless the researcher controls for these factors, the study might
reach an erroneous conclusion—a problem referred to as “omitted
variable bias.”90 If military recruits are significantly less educated
than the rest of the population, looking only at the relationship
between service and later job performance could be misleading.
Including a variable for education in the model might show that
85. See id. at 692-93.
86. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19-20
(2002).
87. See id. at 20-21, 60-61.
88. See id. at 54-55, 99-102.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 78.
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military service is in fact associated with better job performance,
after controlling for an individual’s level of education.
The concern about omitted variable bias can apply to sensitive
characteristics like race and sex in some circumstances. To extend
the example above, suppose that for African Americans military
service is highly positively correlated with subsequent work perfor-
mance, while for white workers it has a somewhat negative effect.
If the dataset includes far more observations about white workers,
then a statistical model that omits race as a variable might predict
that workers with past military service are less successful employ-
ees, even though the opposite is true for African Americans. If an
employer relied on the model to disfavor workers with military
experience, then the failure to include race as a control variable
would ultimately disadvantage African Americans.
The solution is not to throw every possible variable into the
statistical model.91 Including too many variables might also bias
results, especially if some variables are highly correlated. In such a
situation, real effects are obscured, suggesting that no relationship
exists among variables that are in fact related. Thus, for a social
scientist trying to accurately describe relationships and effects in
the real world, choices about which variables to include are crucial.
Because the results of a statistical model are very sensitive to those
choices, the norms of social science dictate that researchers be
transparent about their choices and justify them by reference to the
theory motivating the study. Those norms also encourage data
sharing, to allow other researchers to replicate the study, to further
test the results, and to criticize and revise the findings when
necessary.
In contrast, data mining is inductive and atheoretical.92 Data
miners have no particular theory they are trying to test, nor are
they necessarily interested in explaining observed relationships
between different variables. Instead, data mining exploits enormous
datasets with thousands of variables to uncover whatever statistical
correlations might exist in the data. With no motivating theory to
91. See id. at 79-80.
92. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 12-14 (2013) (explaining that big data
shifts the focus from discovering causal relationships to uncovering patterns in the data);
Custers, supra note 56, at 16.
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justify the choices made, it is difficult to assess whether the data
relied on is sufficiently representative, or whether the appropriate
variables have been included to ensure the accuracy of the model.
And in the absence of data sharing or transparency about the
choices made in constructing the model, others cannot test the
robustness and validity of the results. 
Concerns that a data model may systematically disadvantage
traditionally protected groups cannot be resolved simply by elimi-
nating protected characteristics like race and sex from the data. As
Barocas and Selbst explain, other types of information that closely
correlate with those protected characteristics may serve as proxies,
producing the same results without expressly relying on those
categories.93 At the same time, the possibility of omitted variable
bias means that excluding race and gender variables will sometimes
increase the risk of bias by failing to capture relevant differences
between groups. The remedy is therefore not to exclude or include
variables for sensitive characteristics in every case.
Because data mining is concerned only with identifying relation-
ships, the model’s creators often do not know whether correlations
that are uncovered represent genuine relationships between factors
in the real world or are artifacts of the data mining process. Social
scientists expend a great deal of effort trying to determine whether
an observed relationship between variables is causal. Because of the
difficulty of establishing causality through statistics alone, a claim
that two variables are related is subject to retesting and constantly
open to challenge. By contrast, data mining models make predic-
tions based on the strength of the statistical correlation alone. 
In some contexts, we may not care much about the limitations of
data mining. For example, if a computer algorithm can correctly flag
which purchases made on my credit card are fraudulent and notify
me, it does not matter whether I, or my bank, understand which
variables triggered the alert or why. The difference between correl-
ation and causation becomes important, however, if employers are
basing their decisions on these statistical relationships. Suppose, for
example, that data mining shows a strong statistical relationship
between intelligence and “liking” curly fries on Facebook.94 An
93. See, e.g., supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
94. See Kosinski et al., supra note 62, at 5804.
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employer seeking highly intelligent employees might justify reliance
on that correlation in selecting employees, even if it has a racially
disproportionate effect, on the grounds that intelligence is a
relevant job criterion.95 If, however, the variables are merely
correlated and not causally related, there is no necessary connection
between them, and the correlation may not hold in the future. An
employer relying on the statistical correlation may continue to make
decisions disadvantaging minority applicants, even after the
statistical relationship no longer holds true. Although it may seem
clear that “liking” curly fries is not causally related to intelligence,
in other cases it will not be intuitively obvious whether a given
correlation is meaningful or spurious. But the same risk is pre-
sent—that the algorithm is relying on a factor that has a discrimi-
natory effect but is not actually connected to job performance. 
Another novel challenge posed by data mining models is their
lack of transparency. Many algorithms are built using machine
learning techniques, which do not require the human programmer
to specify in advance which factors the model should consider or
what weight each should be given. Instead, the computer constructs
a model by exploiting the relationships it uncovers between
variables in the data. These relationships may be quite complex,
such that in some cases the resulting model is completely opaque,
even to its creators. When such a model is relied on to screen or
rank applicants, it obscures the basis on which employers are
making ultimate employment decisions. This lack of transparency
makes it difficult to know if any observed bias is simply a byproduct
of justifiable business considerations or the result of flaws in the
model’s construction.
A related concern is that mechanisms to improve the accuracy of
predictive models may not work in the context of employment. Big
data enthusiasts often defend the use of algorithms on the ground
that if the predictions are inaccurate, the machine will “learn” over
time, such that any errors will be eliminated.96 To return to the
95. The study by Kosinski and others also found that “liking” “I Love Being a Mom” is
predictive of low intelligence. Id. The discriminatory impact on women that would result from
relying on that apparent correlation is obvious.
96. See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 92, at 12 (arguing that big data
systems can “improve themselves over time” by continuing to look for signals and patterns as
they receive new data).
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example of credit card fraud detection, if the algorithm makes an
error in classifying a charge on my credit card, I will discover the
error sooner or later and report it. My feedback will be incorporated
and the model will update and refine its decision process, becoming
more accurate over time.
When applied to employment decisions, however, the process of
error detection and learning is far less likely to occur. In the case of
credit card fraud, consumers can observe and report the error. In
the case of employment decisions, not all types of errors will be
observable. Suppose an employer relies on an algorithm to sort
applicants into “qualified” and “unqualified” pools. After hiring an
applicant, the employer can observe the new employee’s work per-
formance and will learn if the model made a mistake in classifying
the applicant as qualified. However, if the algorithm mistakenly
labeled an applicant as “unqualified,” the employer will not hire her
and therefore will never observe her work performance. As a result,
there will be no opportunity to learn of the error and update the
model.
Once bias enters the system, feedback loops may reinforce that
bias. Recall the example of Google’s algorithm which advertised
criminal background checks more often when searches were con-
ducted for African American-associated names than for Caucasian-
associated names.97 Those results likely reflect patterns in past
search behavior, rather than any discriminatory bias on the part of
the programmers who created the algorithm.98 Nevertheless, the ads
might nudge even the nonprejudiced employer, who otherwise would
not treat applicants differently because of race, to scrutinize the
criminal history of African American applicants more closely than
white applicants. If, as a result of the nudge, the employer conducts
criminal background checks more often for African American ap-
plicants than for white applicants, it will find more instances of
criminal history in that population, further reinforcing a cycle of
bias.
Feedback effects could also reinforce biased outcomes if disfavor-
ed groups are aware of the bias. If members of a particular group
perceive that selection processes are systematically biased against
97. See Sweeney, supra note 17, at 46-47.
98. See id. at 52.
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them and their chances of success are much less than for others,
they may reduce their investment in developing their human cap-
ital.99 This risk may be particularly significant if the patterns they
observe suggest that the types of signals they have some control
over—education, training, and the like—are not decisive and that
other unknown or uncontrollable factors are shaping their employ-
ment opportunities.
Data mining models are thus far from neutral. Choices are made
at every step of the process—selecting the target variable, choosing
the training data, labeling cases, determining which variables to
include or exclude—and each of these choices may introduce bias
along the lines of race, sex, or other protected characteristics.
Because of the atheoretical nature of data mining, once these biases
are introduced, they may be difficult to detect and eliminate. Mere
correlation may be mistaken for causation, and the true basis for
employer decision-making is obscured. Moreover, these biases may
persist or even worsen over time because of limited opportunities for
error detection and the operation of feedback effects. For all of these
reasons, identifying and addressing the potential harms that biased
algorithms cause should be matters of policy concern.
C. Types of Harm
Although many scholars have raised alarms that data analytics
can produce biased outcomes, they have not articulated the precise
nature of the harms that biased algorithms impose, or explained
why they should be matters of policy concern. A common assump-
tion among critics is that any type of bias in an algorithm is
normatively troubling and requires policy or legal interventions.
However, this assumption is unwarranted and overly broad.
Virtually any decision-making process will produce disproportionate
effects, and sometimes those effects will fall along protected class
lines. What matters are the reasons unequal outcomes are occurring
and whether those reasons are normatively acceptable.
99. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
464 & n.254 (2000) (citing economics literature that discrimination can be self-perpetuating
if it discourages members of groups facing discrimination from investing in their human
capital).
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In this Section, I explain why certain types of bias in data models
produce cognizable harms. Barocas and Selbst’s taxonomy, dis-
cussed in the last Section, sought to explain the specific technical
issues that can cause data models to discriminate.100 My focus in
this Section is different—namely, to identify the different types of
harm that might result when employers rely on biased data models.
Because the nature of the harm depends in part on the source of the
bias, my typology of harms partially overlaps, but does not coincide,
with their taxonomy. In what follows, I identify four distinct types
of equality harms that may occur when employers rely on data
analytics to distribute employment opportunities.
1. Intentional Discrimination
One type of harm results when an employer uses data analytics
to intentionally discriminate against a protected group.101 In such
a scenario, the employer relies on an algorithm to make hiring or
promotion decisions because it knows the model produces a
discriminatory result and intends that result to occur. The discrimi-
natory decision simply masquerades behind the neutral façade of
data analysis.102 This type of discrimination is familiar as a form of
intentional disparate treatment, only with the twist that the
pretext—the “legitimate business reason” given for the decision—is
the output of a computer model.
Although an employer might use data analytics as a screen for
race or sex discrimination, an algorithm may be particularly effec-
tive in masking discrimination where the protected characteristic is
not readily observable—for example, genetic traits and some kinds
of disabilities. The law currently attempts to prevent these types of
discrimination by restricting access to information about the
protected characteristics. Thus, the Americans with Disabilities Act
restricts an employer’s ability to conduct medical exams or to
100. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 677.
101. In Barocas and Selbst’s taxonomy, this is referred to as “masking.” Id. at 692. Other
scholars also catalogue the different ways that an algorithm can enable intentional
discrimination. See, e.g., Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 5, at 36-38; Kroll et al., supra note
5 (manuscript at 32-34).
102. See Custers, supra note 56, at 9-10.
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inquire about a disability prior to making a job offer,103 and the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act forbids employers from
seeking any kind of genetic information about applicants or
employees.104 An employer who believes that certain individuals are
more costly to employ might use data profiles to identify and screen
them out without ever explicitly asking for medical or genetic
information. Several years ago, Target Stores used purchasing
information to identify consumers who were in the early stages of
pregnancy in order to send them coupons for baby products.105 An
employer with access to large amounts of behavioral data might
similarly use that information to predict which applicants or
employees pose future medical risks.106 
When employers use data simply to mask intentional discrimina-
tion, the individual who loses out on an employment opportunity
suffers the same type of harm as any other victim of intentional
discrimination. The harm is direct and specific to the individual
with the targeted characteristic.
2. Record Errors
A second type of harm arises when errors in an individual’s record
lead to the denial of an employment opportunity. For example, data
collected from public sites might suggest that an individual has a
criminal record or has defaulted on a loan, when in fact that is not
true. The privacy literature, discussed in Part II.B, has focused on
this type of harm. Inaccurate information does not inherently raise
equality concerns, as errors may be randomly distributed, infecting
the records of members of privileged groups as well as protected
groups. However, evidence suggests that errors are more likely to
103. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A)
(2012) (“[A] covered entity shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job
applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature
or severity of such disability.”).
104. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) § 202, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ff-1(b) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to request,
require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or a family member of
the employee.”).
105. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/88XA-
HHT7].
106. See Zarya, supra note 10.
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occur for members of subgroups that are farther from the main-
stream. For example, individuals whose names have less common
spellings—most likely ethnic names—have greater rates of error in
records relating to their employability.107 Similarly, people with two
surnames—disproportionately Hispanics—or who have changed
their names—disproportionately women—are more likely to have
inaccuracies in their records.108
When an algorithm makes a prediction based on error-ridden
data about an applicant, it may unfairly deprive that individual of
an employment opportunity. The overall operation of the model may
be unbiased in the sense that it accurately predicts outcomes for
individuals about whom it has reliable data. If, however, errors are
not randomly distributed, then the model’s predictions may be more
likely to produce erroneous predictions for some, and could result in
outcomes systematically biased against members of certain
groups.109 In such a situation, it is theoretically possible to identify
individual victims who can be made whole by granting access to the
opportunities they would have had absent the errors in their
records.110 Of course, significant practical challenges may make it
difficult to detect when errors are present in an individual’s records
and to prove that they caused the adverse outcome. Although proof
may be difficult, the harm is easily conceptualized—identifiable
individuals have lost out on specific employment opportunities.
3. Statistical Bias
A third type of harm may result from data models that are
statistically biased, in the sense that they systematically disfavor a
protected class because of the way the underlying model was
created. Social scientists refer to statistical bias when problems
107. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROVE YOURSELF TO WORK: THE 10 BIG PROBLEMS
WITH E-VERIFY (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/everify_white_paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9K8A-N8L5].
108. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 52.
109. If record errors are pervasive for certain protected classes in the training data, they
may also bias the model as a whole, such that even when applied to a population for whom
accurate records are available, the outcomes will be biased. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note
5, at 684-85. This is a type of statistical bias, discussed in Part I.C.3.
110. Cf. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 20, at 4-5; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 20, at
101.
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such as selection effects or omitted variables cause a model to be
biased in the sense that it is systematically inaccurate in some
way.111 Similarly, data mining models built using biased, error-
ridden, or unrepresentative data may be statistically biased.112
Because of problems with the data or the model’s construction, an
algorithm may inaccurately capture relationships in the data,
leading to imprecise or even erroneous predictions.
When statistical bias coincides with systematic disadvantage to
protected classes, it causes discriminatory harm. The algorithm’s
creators may not have made the choices that produced the discrimi-
natory effects with conscious intent to discriminate or even aware-
ness of their biasing effects. Nevertheless, the resulting outcomes
are not only biased in a statistical sense, but also in the colloquial
sense of unfairly disadvantaging members of protected groups. The
employer’s practice has a discriminatory effect, and the statistical
unreliability of the model undermines any justification for its use.
This type of bias, which results from the operation of a model, is
structural in nature rather than individual. Correcting errors in the
data about particular individuals will not solve the problem. Even
if all the data used to predict future cases are entirely accurate, the
algorithm produces results that are systematically biased against
a protected group. The harm is also structural in the sense that it
cannot be corrected for just one individual applicant or employee.
The harmful effects on a protected group result from the operation
of the model as a whole. This means that it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to identify specific individual victims of discrimination.
Imagine a situation in which an employer relies on a biased
algorithm to hire 100 employees from a pool of 1000 applicants.
Suppose that 200 of the applicants (20 percent) are African Ameri-
can, but the employer only hires five. Of the 195 African American
applicants who were not hired, it will be difficult to determine who
would have been hired if the employer had not used the biased
algorithm. Doing so requires making assumptions about what the
model or the decision process would have looked like if constructed
without the biasing choices. The difficulty is that there is not likely
111. See GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 28 (1996).
112. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 684-87.
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to be a single unbiased alternative. Because model creation entails
so many choices, multiple unbiased or less biased alternatives are
possible, each of which might have selected a different set of
individuals from the applicant pool for hire.
In the absence of a clear baseline against which to compare the
outcomes, it is difficult to say that a particular individual in a
protected class has been harmed while another has not. The harm
to any given individual might be more accurately characterized as
a reduction in their probability of selection rather than the loss of
a job.113 This uncertainty in identifying individual harms does not
mitigate the fact that the operation of the model overall threatens
a social harm if its effects are to entrench the disadvantage that
subordinated groups experience.
4. Structural Disadvantage
Even in the absence of statistical bias, an algorithm may produce
disproportionate effects on a protected class. It may accurately cap-
ture the relationships between various attributes in the data in a
way that produces outcomes that systematically disadvantage cer-
tain groups.114 Note that with data mining models using large
datasets, it may be practically difficult, if not impossible, to rule out
the possibility that statistical bias has caused the discriminatory
effects. At least as a theoretical matter, however, it is possible that
a model is not biased in the statistical sense, but its operation
systematically disadvantages members of a protected class. It might
do so because the members of the protected class in fact differ in
some systematic way relevant to characteristics that the model is
trying to predict.115
In such a case, whether a rejected applicant has been harmed
depends upon societal judgments about the fairness of the model.
And whether a model should be considered fair depends on what
attributes it leverages to make its predictions and on the normative
113. For a similar argument that affirmative action programs should be understood as
altering the odds of success rather than actually depriving any particular individual of an
opportunity, see Pauline T. Kim, Essay, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 12,
30-35 (2003).
114. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 691.
115. See id.
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acceptability of relying on those factors. Certain attributes may be
sufficiently related to job performance that the law should allow
employers to rely on them regardless of their impact. For example,
a company might reasonably screen applicants for legal positions to
ensure that they are licensed to practice law, even if that selection
criterion disadvantages certain groups. Whether employers should
rely on other criteria, such as credit scores or criminal record
history, is far more debatable, and resolving those questions turns
on contested normative judgments.
The nature of data mining complicates our ability to make these
types of judgments. Algorithms based on machine learning may be
agnostic about what qualities make a good employee, and the
resulting model may be opaque as to how it is sorting applicants or
employees. Alternatively, the quality or characteristic the model
seeks to maximize (the target variable) may be clearly specified, but
the algorithm is so complex that it is not possible to explain which
factors drive the model’s predictions. Even when the factors are
identifiable, a pure data mining model will not reveal whether the
relationships uncovered are causal or merely coincidental.116 Thus,
in addition to familiar debates about whether certain selection
criteria are closely enough related to the job, data analytics raise
new questions about whether the law should permit employers to
rely on unknown or unexplained correlations when they have the
effect of disadvantaging certain groups.
Consider a simple example. Suppose a model analyzing tens of
thousands of observations finds that residents of certain zip codes
tend to perform more poorly at a particular job. Because residence
is often associated with race, the model may effectively screen out
minority applicants at higher rates. The data and methods used to
build the model may be unimpeachable, such that there are no
concerns about statistical bias. Or, put differently, the available
evidence might suggest that the correlation is a genuine one.
Nevertheless, as a normative matter, relying on this association
may be unacceptable, not only because residence does not measure
ability, but also because our country has a long history of housing
segregation along racial lines.
116. See Custers, supra note 56, at 16.
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A more difficult question is raised if the algorithmic bias results
from a factor less clearly identified with past racial harms. Suppose,
for example, that an algorithm uncovers a strong statistical correl-
ation between job performance and a seemingly arbitrary factor like
what kind of automobile someone drives, but the effect of relying on
that factor is to reduce opportunities for members of a minority
group. Some models may be so complex that it is impossible to
specify which factors influence the results, or what precise weights
different factors have in determining the model’s predictions.
Without knowing the precise mechanism producing the outcome, it
is impossible to judge whether it is normatively acceptable to rely
on the factors it leverages.
Thus, when an algorithm produces structural disadvantage that
is not caused by statistical bias, the nature of the harm is more
difficult to characterize. In such a case, the model’s disparate
outcomes may reflect genuine differences between groups that are
relevant to job performance, or it may simply be capturing arbitrary
and meaningless correlations. Whether it causes social harm
depends on which differences the model leverages to make its
predictions and on contested normative judgments about the
acceptability of relying on those factors. To the extent that a harm
occurs, however, it is a group-based harm. As with discriminatory
statistical bias, the disadvantage is structural, and therefore ident-
ifying particular individual victims will be difficult.
D. Classification Bias 
As discussed in Part I.C, algorithmic decision-making can produce
various types of harms for individuals or protected groups deprived
of employment opportunities. Apart from the first type—intentional
discrimination—these harms do not easily fit traditional notions of
discrimination as motivated by prejudice or animus. And yet, the
growing use of big data and data analytics in the workplace risks
creating or reinforcing patterns of disadvantage and subordination
that will be very similar in effect to more familiar forms of discrimi-
nation from the past.
These risks raise a concern about what I call “classification
bias”—namely, the use of classification schemes that have the effect
of exacerbating inequality or disadvantage along lines of race, sex,
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or other protected characteristics. I use the term classification bias
to emphasize concerns about inequality and disadvantage, and at
the same time to underscore that this type of bias results from
mechanisms that are quite distinct from familiar forms of discrimi-
nation. More specifically, classification bias is data-driven, which
means that the traditional legal tools for responding to discrimina-
tion are in many ways inadequate, as discussed in Parts II and III
below.
The term “classification bias” resonates with the data science
literature, which identifies “classification” as one of several basic
data mining techniques;117 however, I do not use the phrase in any
technical sense. Other data mining techniques that are used to sort
and score workers may also systematically disadvantage certain
groups. Thus, classification bias applies whenever an algorithm—
regardless of its logical structure—systemically biases applicants’
or employees’ access to opportunities.
In speaking of classification bias, I do not mean to invoke what is
sometimes referred to as “anticlassification” theory.118 Scholars have
long debated what principles underlie antidiscrimination law. Some
scholars have argued that the guiding principle should be one of
formal equality—namely, that the law’s protections extend only as
far as forbidding employers from making decisions based on an
individual’s race, sex, or other protected characteristics.119 This
perspective, sometimes referred to as the “anticlassification princi-
ple,” identifies discriminatory harm primarily in the use of clas-
sifications—like race—to make decisions.120 Anticlassification theory
stands in contrast to antisubordination theory, which aims to
promote equality by redressing structures and practices that dis-
advantage historically subordinated groups, regardless of whether
the employer expressly or intentionally relied on race or other
117. See, e.g., Toon Calders & Bart Custers, What Is Data Mining and How Does It Work?,
in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 56, at 27, 31-34.
118. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (describing the
anticlassification principle as holding that the government may not classify people on the
basis of a forbidden category such as race and explaining that it exists in tension with an
antisubordination principle).
119. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 797-98, 809-10 (1979).
120. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 118, at 10.
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categories in making its decisions.121 Like antisubordination theory,
the concept of classification bias proposed here looks at the conse-
quences of employers’ decisions. By asking whether neutral
classification schemes work to systematically deprive already
disadvantaged groups of opportunities, it shares the concerns of
antisubordination theorists.
In Part III, I examine to what extent antidiscrimination law can
respond to concerns about classification bias. But first, in Part II, I
consider two other possible responses and explain why they are
likely inadequate to meet the challenges posed by data-driven
discrimination.
II. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF REGULATION
This Part explores whether market forces or privacy law protec-
tions can be relied on to eliminate classification bias, and concludes
that neither approach is likely to successfully meet concerns about
inequality raised by workforce analytics.
A. The Market Response
Proponents of market-based solutions might argue that the grow-
ing use of data mining models in employment raises no particular
concerns because employers will rely on them only if they are
effective. Collecting and analyzing data is expensive and employers
will not do so, or pay a third party to do so, unless the benefits
exceed the costs. The promised benefit of workforce analytics is that
they will save employers time and money when making personnel
decisions and will produce a better workforce.122 Rational employers
will not rely on these tools if they do not actually help them hire and
retain good employees, and, therefore, market forces should
eliminate models that are biased.
Michael Lewis’s book, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair
Game, has contributed to the idea that data analytics can accurately
predict performance. Moneyball tells the story of Billy Beane, the
121. See, e.g., id. at 9; Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 107, 157-58 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 37, at 319-20.
122. See Bersin, supra note 3.
2017] DATA-DRIVEN DISCRIMINATION AT WORK 893
Oakland Athletics manager who built a competitive baseball team
with a limited payroll.123 By substituting statistical analysis for
hunches, intuition, and conventional wisdom, Beane was able to
identify undervalued ballplayers and recruit them at a fraction of
the cost of their true worth.124 Since then, statistical analysis has
become a standard tool that major league baseball teams use to
identify talent.125 The lesson seemed to be that statistics can not
only help identify talent, but that they succeed in doing so because
they are more “objective” and can overcome traditional prejudices.126
The success of statistics in baseball scouting does not translate
easily to more ordinary jobs, however. As Nate Silver points out,
baseball is unique in that it “offers perhaps the world’s richest data
set.”127 Not only are there lots of data about almost everything that
happens in baseball games, but also the nature of the sport permits
the collection of objective measures of individual performance under
well-specified conditions—for example, batting statistics in a given
ballpark against a particular pitcher.128 Statistics revolutionized
baseball to the extent that it did “because of the sport’s unique
combination of rapidly developing technology, well-aligned incen-
tives, tough competition, and rich data.”129
123. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME
(2003).
124. See id. at 18, 37-42, 127-29.
125. See NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT
SOME DON’T 86-88 (2012).
126. See id. at 91-92.
127. See id. at 80.
128. Id. (“[A]lthough baseball is a team sport, it proceeds in a highly orderly way: pitchers
take their turn in the rotation, hitters take their turn in the batting order, and they are
largely responsible for their own statistics.”). This type of data is harder to come by in other
professional sports in which statistics have had less of an impact to date. See Leigh Steinberg,
Changing the Game: The Rise of Sports Analytics, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2015, 3:08 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2015/08/18/changing-the-game-the-rise-of-sports-
analytics/ [https://perma.cc/WXV6-EDL4] (noting that although use of data analytics in all
professional sports has increased, it is harder to adapt analytics to basketball than baseball);
Reeves Wiedeman, The Sabermetrics of Football, NEW YORKER (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.
newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/the-sabermetrics-of-football[ https://perma.cc/7TRY-F3FE]
(discussing why baseball is “more receptive to stats” than football). Even in baseball, statistics
have not eliminated the role of scouts, and successful teams today use a combination of
quantitative and qualitative information. See SILVER, supra note 125, at 91-92, 99-101.
129. SILVER, supra note 125, at 106.
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In the more ordinary workplace, data models are more likely to
exhibit bias,130 and market competition will not reliably eliminate
them. First, biased data models may be accurate enough to persist
in a competitive market, even though they are biased against cer-
tain groups. Second, feedback effects may appear to confirm the
accuracy of biased data models, entrenching their use. And finally,
biased data models may be efficient precisely because they are
discriminatory, and therefore pressures toward efficiency will not
eliminate them.
The first reason that market pressures are unlikely to drive out
classification bias is that a model may be sufficiently accurate to
benefit employers who use them, even if, at the same time, they
have a discriminatory effect. Consider an algorithm that selects
candidates who are predicted to be more successful at a particular
job. It may be highly effective in identifying strong candidates, even
though it disproportionately excludes members of disadvantaged
groups. So long as the algorithm is accurate enough to make the
employer’s process less costly, neither the employer nor the vendor
will have sufficient incentive to identify and remove the bias.
This difficulty is compounded when considering singular, high-
level positions for which there are few objective measures of
performance. In baseball, the availability of highly detailed, objec-
tive, and publicly available data about performance means that a
team will have numerous observations for comparing the perfor-
mances of players in nearly identical circumstances.131 In the case
of other highly skilled workers, comparing performance is far more
difficult. Finding an objective measure may not be possible, and
even if one exists, comparisons will be difficult because a firm can-
not observe the performance of the accepted and rejected candidates
under identical circumstances. Without this information, it is diffi-
cult to assess the benefit or the cost of the choice actually made.
Imagine a company that relies on a data algorithm to choose
among several applicants for a management position. The model
might be biased in a way that discounts the leadership styles more
typical of female candidates, such that it systematically assigns
130. See supra Part I.B.
131. Offensive ability in baseball is reliably captured by statistics, but defensive ability has
proven somewhat more challenging to measure objectively. See LEWIS, supra note 123, at 136.
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them lower scores, but nevertheless accurately identifies some
candidates who are capable of performing the job. The employer
may not recognize that the model is biased—particularly if its
predictions match the decision maker’s prior implicit assumptions
or expectations. In other words, the same cognitive biases that data
purportedly help to avoid may cause the human decision makers not
to notice when the model is biased.
If, relying on such a model, the employer selects a man for the job,
and that man is ultimately successful in the position, the employer
will have no reason to question the algorithm, even though an unbi-
ased model might have prioritized others, including more female
candidates. A female candidate might also have been successful in
the job—maybe even more successful—but the employer will have
no way of knowing that. So long as the algorithm is accurate
enough, the employer would have no reason to distrust it.
Employers may persist in using biased algorithms to select for
low skill positions as well. For these jobs, the basic skills may be
widely available in the labor pool, and the relevant performance
metrics may be easier to measure and compare across time. For
example, an employer concerned with high turnover in low-skilled
positions can easily measure the length of job tenure of different
employees. The employer may utilize data mining tools in an effort
to select employees who will stay longer at the job, and then com-
pare the job tenure of employees hired before and after adopting the
model. If the employer observes that employees hired using the
model stay on the job longer, it may take that as confirmation of its
accuracy. In fact, the model may not have identified the factors that
actually increase job tenure. Some other factor, such as a decrease
in alternative employment options, may have caused the observed
increase in job tenure and would have similarly influenced those
applicants not selected to stay on the job longer as well. Alterna-
tively, an unbiased model might have similarly increased tenure
without the discriminatory impact. Nevertheless, the employer’s
observations would not lead it to question the model, and it would
likely continue to use it, even though the effect is to disproportion-
ately screen out minority applicants. 
A second reason market forces may not reliably squeeze out
classification bias is that feedback effects may cause biased models
to become more accurate over time—the model in effect becoming a
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self-fulfilling prophecy. Suppose, for example, that an employer uses
a data model to select employees for an entry-level position for
which many applicants meet the minimum qualifications. If the
model is biased, such that it overselects individuals in a dominant
group, then fewer minority group members will be hired, and the
employer will have little opportunity to observe their performance
in the position. At the same time, members of the minority
group—particularly if similar processes restrict their access to other
employment opportunities—may perceive a lower return to effort
and therefore lose the incentive to invest in learning relevant
skills.132 A model which erroneously underpredicted minority per-
formance may become more accurate over time. If similar biases
operate across multiple domains, affecting access to other critical
resources like housing and credit, then these feedback effects will
multiply. Thus, when biased selection processes create feedback
effects, market forces will tend to affirm rather than disconfirm
their usefulness.
Finally, in those cases in which a data model is accurate because
it is discriminatory, market forces will not eliminate classification
bias. As discussed earlier, a model may incorporate biased judg-
ments—for example, ratings by supervisors that are themselves
biased—as a measure of job performance. If employers use such a
model to predict future cases, and the performances of the selected
employees are then evaluated using the same biased measure, the
outcomes will simply confirm the “correctness” of the model. In
other situations, a model might capture real market differences
between employees, but those differences are themselves the prod-
uct of discriminatory forces. One can imagine, for example, that
women are less productive in nontraditional employment settings
if they face resistance to their presence that is manifested in
harassment and noncooperation from their coworkers. A model that
predicts future performance based on the past would both reflect
prior discrimination and be highly accurate. Once again, an em-
ployer focused on efficiency gains is unlikely to abandon the model.
Thus, market forces will not reliably eliminate classification bias.
The market may squeeze out highly inaccurate models that fail to
provide enough benefit to justify the cost to employers. In many
132. See Bagenstos, supra note 99, at 464.
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cases, however, algorithms are likely to have some predictive value
even if they are biased against certain protected groups. If they are
accurate enough, employers will not have strong market incentives
to abandon them or to incur the costs of searching for less biased
alternatives.
B. Privacy Rights
If market forces will not reliably eliminate biased algorithms,
then what about regulation aimed at protecting informational
privacy? Can restrictions on the collection, disclosure, and use of
personal information address the risks of classification bias that
data analytics pose? Privacy law scholars argue for more robust
rules regulating information flows, suggesting that such rules would
not only protect dignitary and autonomy interests, but also address
the risk of discrimination as well.133 Although information rules can
certainly mitigate some of the threats to workplace equality, they
cannot entirely meet the challenges posed by workplace analytics.
A full exploration of the complex relationship between privacy and
discrimination is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this
Section briefly explains why even robust privacy protections are
unlikely to fully resolve concerns about data-driven discrimination
in the workplace.134
In some circumstances, privacy rights can prevent intentional
discrimination from occurring. Thus, antidiscrimination statutes
sometimes incorporate restrictions on employers’ information gath-
ering. For example, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
prohibits employers from inquiring about or otherwise deliberately
acquiring genetic information about applicants and employees.135
133. See, e.g., Richards & King, supra note 20, at 409-13.
134. In earlier work, I argued that protecting the privacy of sensitive information could
prevent genetic discrimination from occurring. See Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination,
Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 1497, 1501-02 (2002). That argument turned on the goal of preventing intentional
discrimination and the fact that unexpressed genetic characteristics are not identifiable
through casual observation. See id. at 1517, 1521. My observations about the connections
between privacy and discrimination in that context do not necessarily apply in a data-rich
environment where the discriminatory outcomes may not be intentional.
135. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-
1(b) (2012).
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The Americans with Disabilities Act similarly limits employers’
access to medical information that might reveal the existence of a
disability at certain stages of the employment process.136 This
strategy works when the protected characteristic is not readily
observable.137 If the employer does not know about a protected
characteristic, such as a disability or a genetic predisposition to
disease, it cannot discriminate on that basis. This strategy will ob-
viously be less successful in preventing discrimination on the basis
of highly salient characteristics like race and sex. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act does not contain a similar prohibition on acquiring
information, although employer inquiries—for example, about an
employee’s plans to have children—may raise an inference that a
later adverse action was taken on a prohibited basis. Restricting
access to information can be effective in preventing intentional
discrimination when the employer would not otherwise know about
the protected characteristic and therefore would be unable to act on
that basis.138
However, restricting access to sensitive information is not likely
to be effective in preventing classification bias that results from
data analytic models. If the data being mined is rich enough, other
seemingly neutral factors may closely correlate with a protected
characteristic, permitting a model to effectively sort along the lines
of race or another protected characteristic.139 Factors such as where
someone went to school or where they currently live may be highly
correlated with race. Behavioral data, such as an individual’s Face-
book “likes,” can also predict sensitive characteristics like race and
sex with a high degree of accuracy.140 Because other information
contained in large datasets can serve as a proxy for race, disability,
or other protected statuses, simply eliminating data on those char-
acteristics cannot prevent models that are biased along these
dimensions. On the other hand, the problem of omitted variable bias
means that prohibiting the collection or use of sensitive data may
136. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) §  102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
137. See Kim, supra note 134, at 1517; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(d) (West 2016).
138. Cf. Kim, supra note 134, at 1521.
139. See Custers, supra note 56, at 9-10.
140. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 81, 83 (2013); Kosinski et al., supra note 62, at 5804 fig.4. 
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sometimes increase the biased effects of a data model.141 Thus, a
simple prohibition on access to sensitive information will not pre-
vent classification bias, and in some cases could make it worse.
Another approach to protecting privacy focuses on procedural
protections. Fair information practices emphasize the right of indi-
viduals to know when and how personal data is collected, to ensure
its accuracy, and to consent to its use.142 However, these procedural
rights have not significantly limited the types of data collected or
how employers use that information. Applicants and employees
often have little choice but to acquiesce to employer requests for
information, and the law grants employers wide discretion in mak-
ing employment decisions.143 As a result, the emphasis on consent
and data accuracy has had limited practical effect in restricting the
information available to employers to make employment decisions.
Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which
embodies fair information practice principles, is illustrative.144 The
FCRA requires an employer to obtain an applicant’s consent before
it accesses a consumer report,145 to provide notice of an adverse
action based on a consumer report along with a copy of the report,
and to provide information about the individual’s rights to dispute
the report’s accuracy.146 These requirements put few obstacles in the
path of employers who wish to use consumer data to make person-
nel decisions. Job applicants have little choice but to consent to the
use of credit reports if they wish to be considered for a job. If an
141. See supra Part I.B.
142. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 17.
143. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relation-
ship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 717 (1996).
144. See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) § 602, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). For a more
detailed discussion of the FCRA’s limited ability to address concerns about algorithmic bias,
see generally Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of
Information Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2809910 [https://perma.cc/N35G-P9FR].
145. The FCRA defines a “consumer report” as 
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer
reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing,
credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode
of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for
the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for
... employment purposes.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
146. Id. § 1681b(b).
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employer denies employment based on the report, the applicant’s
recourse is to try to correct any errors in that record.147 The FCRA
provides no remedy against an employer for failure to hire even
when the employer relied on an inaccurate credit report. Relying on
an accurate record to make decisions violates no legal prohibitions
either, as long as all of the procedural steps have been followed.
Thus, fair information practice principles are unlikely to signifi-
cantly limit employer use of data models.
Scholars have widely criticized the reliance on notice and consent
to protect privacy interests, especially in the era of big data.148
Lengthy, jargon-filled disclosures encountered in nearly every
internet transaction do not provide real notice,149 and because the
alternative to accepting those terms is to refuse the service or
transaction, consumers have little real choice about how their
personal information will be handled. The processing of big data
exacerbates the problem of obtaining meaningful consent. Separate
data streams can be combined, and, once aggregated, data may
reveal far more about an individual’s habits, tastes, and opinions
than the individual data points alone would suggest.150 As the
example of Target Stores predicting which consumers were preg-
nant demonstrates,151 the disclosure of relatively trivial bits of
information may reveal far more sensitive information when data
is aggregated and analyzed. Thus, consent obtained at the moment
data is collected is not meaningful, given that it is impossible to
know all subsequent uses of that information and its impact in
advance.152
In response to the challenges posed by big data, privacy scholars
have proposed forms of regulation that go beyond traditional fair
information practice principles. As Neil Richards and Jonathan
King point out, privacy rules are not just about secrecy or restricting
147. See id. § 1681i(f)(2)(B)(i).
148. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 20, at 27-28; Crawford & Schultz, supra note
20, at 108; Richards & Hartzog, supra note 20 (manuscript at 17-21); Daniel J. Solove,
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880,
1880-81 (2013).
149. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 20 (manuscript at 18) (citing studies).
150. See Solove, supra note 148, at 1889-90.
151. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
152. Solove, supra note 148, at 1889-90.
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access to personal information.153 Rather, privacy should be under-
stood as “the rules that govern how information flows.”154 For
example, Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz advocate for a form of
procedural data due process entitling individuals to know when
predictive analytics are used and to challenge the fairness of the
process.155 Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale similarly assert that
data subjects should have the right to correct inaccurate data and
that regulatory oversight should ensure the fairness of scoring
systems.156
Requiring data transparency, auditing for accuracy, and substan-
tively regulating downstream uses of data are important steps in
ensuring the fair use of data; however, these types of interventions
cannot fully address the risk of classification bias in employment.
Inaccuracies in an individual’s record may unfairly deprive her of a
particular opportunity, but accurate records do not guarantee
unbiased outcomes. If an individual is excluded because of errors in
her individual record, procedural rights can help correct the errors.
However, fixing errors in an individual’s record will not prevent
statistical bias or structural disadvantage—harms which result
from the overall operation, rather than any individual application,
of an algorithm. Because these harms operate by reducing opportu-
nities for members of a group as a whole, merely correcting
individual errors will not eliminate them. Thus, even robust privacy
law regimes that focus on data accuracy are likely insufficient to
address concerns about classification bias in employment.
III. THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION RESPONSE
If neither the market nor privacy protections can reliably prevent
classification bias, what about antidiscrimination law? In the
employment context, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
the landmark piece of legislation establishing the antidiscrimination
norm by forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, and national origin.157 Later federal enactments extended
153. See Richards & King, supra note 20, at 411-12.
154. Id. at 411.
155. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 20, at 126-27.
156. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 20, at 20-22. 
157. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
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protections to older workers158 and individuals with disabilities,159
and prohibited discrimination based on genetic traits.160 How do
these laws apply to bias that is data-driven? Barocas and Selbst
examined this question and concluded that “Title VII would appear
to bless” the use of algorithms, even when they work to disadvan-
tage protected groups.161 In this Part, I reject that conclusion,
arguing instead that employment discrimination law can provide a
vehicle for addressing classification bias, so long as the doctrine
accounts for its data-driven sources. The discussion below focuses
on Title VII, because both statutory text and judicial interpretation
of other employment discrimination laws often follows that of Title
VII.162
In Section A, I review the conventional understanding of Title VII
which divides prohibited discrimination into two categories—dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact—and explain its limitations
in addressing classification bias. Section B argues that a close
reading of the statutory text supports a finding that Title VII direct-
ly prohibits classification bias. In Section C, I consider what an
effective legal response to classification bias might look like, and
how it should differ from conventional disparate impact theory in
order to more closely meet the unique challenges that biased algo-
rithms pose. The last two Sections of this Part, D and E, consider
whether there are any legal or practical limits to relying on antidis-
crimination law to address classification bias.
A. The Conventional Account of Title VII 
Judges, litigants, and scholars commonly recite that Title VII
prohibits two types of discrimination: disparate treatment and
158. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 §§ 2-12, 14-15, 17, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (2012).
159. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 §§ 2-4, 101-102, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12112.
160. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 §§ 201-212, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11.
161. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 672.
162. Of course, there are differences between Title VII and the other antidiscrimination
statutes, which might affect the analysis, but a close examination of Title VII is a reasonable
starting point. Further work should explore the extent to which the arguments advanced here
do or do not apply to prohibitions on discrimination based on age, disability, or genetic traits.
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disparate impact.163 The standard account holds that disparate
treatment cases involve intentional discrimination based on a
protected characteristic, whereas disparate impact cases target
employer practices that are facially neutral but have discriminatory
effects.164 As many scholars have argued, this neat division of
actionable discrimination into two discrete types oversimplifies the
reality of how bias can operate in the workplace.165 It also arguably
oversimplifies the relationship between these types of discrimina-
tion as a doctrinal matter.166 And, as I argue in Section B of this
Part, it may not be the best reading of the statutory text, or even an
entirely accurate explanation of current doctrine.
Nevertheless, the conventional understanding is the place to
begin. Read narrowly, existing Title VII doctrine does not appear to
match the particular risks to workplace equality that classification
bias poses.167 Only one of the types of harm identified in Part
I.C.—intentional discrimination—easily fits within the conventional
framework. When an employer intends to discriminate but relies on
an apparently neutral data model to justify its decisions, the
traditional disparate treatment doctrine clearly applies.168 The
163. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569 (1978); Charles A. Sulli-
van, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911,
914 (2005) (“Early in its history, the Supreme Court adopted two definitions of the term [‘dis-
criminate’:] ... disparate impact ... [and] disparate treatment.”).
164. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr.,
487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988).
165. See, e.g., Green, supra note 48, at 92; Krieger, supra note 39, at 1164-65; David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 (1993); Sturm,
supra note 48, at 461. 
166. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436-37 (1997);
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept
of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2313 (2006); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to
Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination
Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2007). 
167. Barocas and Selbst similarly concluded that Title VII is “not well equipped” to address
the various discriminatory features of data mining. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 694.
168. Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff has
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03 (1973). The employer must then “articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action. Id. Finally, the plaintiff
has the opportunity to show that the employer’s proffered justification is pretext for discrim-
ination. Id. at 804. If an employer were to point to the predictions of a data model to justify
an adverse decision, the plaintiff could try to prove that the model is merely a pretext for
intentional discrimination.
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plaintiff may find it quite difficult as a practical matter to prove the
employer’s discriminatory intent in using a biased data model;169
however, this scenario poses no conceptual difficulties under the
disparate treatment theory.
As discussed in Part I.B, simply prohibiting use of protected
characteristics will not prevent classification bias. Other nonsensi-
tive variables can act as proxies, such that a model that does not
explicitly consider race or sex may nevertheless have discriminatory
effects along those lines. Moreover, because of the problem of
omitted variable bias, forbidding the use of protected class variables
could exacerbate discriminatory effects under certain circumstances.
Thus, a blanket prohibition on the explicit use of race or other
prohibited characteristics does not avoid, and may even worsen, the
discriminatory impact of relying on a data model.170
The other types of harm resulting from classification bias—due
to individual record errors, statistical bias, and structural disadvan-
tage—can occur without any conscious intent or awareness on the
part of the employer. Disparate impact doctrine would thus seem
the natural place to look for a response. First articulated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the disparate impact
theory holds that Title VII forbids not only overt discrimination, but
also “practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion.”171 The Griggs Court held that Duke Power could not require
applicants to have a high school diploma or a passing score on a
written test unless those requirements had “a demonstrable rela-
tionship to successful performance.”172
The disparate impact theory recognized in Griggs was rooted in
Title VII’s purpose—“to achieve equality of employment opportuni-
ties and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”173
Given that purpose, the Court held that Title VII required “the
169. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 712-14.
170. In fact, mitigating the risk of biased outcomes arguably requires preserving data on
race, sex, and other protected characteristics. See infra Part III.C.
171. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Griggs Court explained that “artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment” that “operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis
of racial or other impermissible classification” are forbidden unless they “bear a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance” of the job. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 429-30.
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removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”174 The lack of
discriminatory intent did not absolve the employer, for it “does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate
as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated” to the
worker’s ability to do the job.175
As described in Griggs, the disparate impact theory would appear
well-suited to address classification bias. Reliance on algorithms
will typically be a facially neutral employment practice. Data
models that do not explicitly categorize on the basis of race or other
protected categories may nevertheless operate as “built-in head-
winds” for disadvantaged groups. However, since the Court first
articulated the concept of disparate impact in Griggs, a doctrinal
superstructure has developed around the theory, which does not fit
well when bias is data driven.176
As refined in subsequent cases and eventually codified by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, disparate impact liability attaches when a
plaintiff has shown that an employment practice produces a dis-
parate impact on the basis of a protected characteristic and the
employer “fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
174. Id. at 431.
175. Id. at 432.
176. Numerous scholars have noted the limitations of the doctrine and its failure to meet
initial expectations of its transformative potential. Civil rights advocates initially heralded
the Griggs decision as monumentally important in advancing the cause of workplace equality.
See, e.g., Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection
of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 433
(2005) (“Aside from Brown v. Board of Education, the single most influential civil rights case
during the past forty years that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, civil rights
jurisprudence and the discourse on equality is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.”); Alfred W.
Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1987) (“Few decisions in our time—perhaps only Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion—have had such momentous social consequences [as Griggs].” (footnote omitted)).
However, many others have viewed the doctrine more skeptically, arguing that it has been
narrowly applied, is inherently limited, and lacks a clear theoretical basis. See, e.g.,
Rutherglen, supra note 166, at 2314; Selmi, supra note 28, at 706 (“[D]isparate impact claims
are more difficult—not easier—to prove than claims of intentional discrimination.”); Sullivan,
supra note 163, at 970, 975-76; Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 621, 626 (2011); Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination:
Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Nicole J. DeSario, Note, Reconceptual-
izing Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate Impact Discrimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 479, 484, 507 (2003).
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related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.”177 Even if the employer satisfies this burden, complain-
ants might still prevail by demonstrating the existence of a less
discriminatory alternative.178 More specifically, a complaining party
could “show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable ... effect [on the protected class], would also serve the
employer’s legitimate interest.”179
Michael Selmi argues that the disparate impact doctrine is not
well suited to application outside the contexts in which the doctrine
developed.180 He points out that the early cases focused on seniority
systems and written tests that employers used to perpetuate
discrimination that had been lawful prior to the passage of Title
VII.181 Contemporaneous commentators understood the significance
of the Griggs case as defining what was required to validate written
employment tests.182 The next disparate impact case decided by the
Supreme Court, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, also involved a chal-
lenge to preemployment tests, as well as an employer’s seniority
system.183 According to Selmi, application of disparate impact doc-
trine to these practices was relatively straightforward because they
involved “specific practices that were easy to identify and for which
there was no difficult causal question” and “[t]he employers’
177. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(1)(A)(ii).
179. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). The exact standard for
establishing liability based on the existence of an alternative employment practice is
uncertain because rather than defining the standard, Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
simply referred to “the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of
‘alternative employment practice.’” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(c). In effect, Congress
restored the law as it existed before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, decided on June 5, 1989. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). In doing so, Congress repudi-
ated the Court’s suggestion in Wards Cove that “any alternative practices ... must be equally
effective as [the employer’s] chosen hiring procedures in achieving [its] legitimate employment
goals,” including factors such as cost and other burdens on the employer. See id. at 661.
However, because there was disagreement prior to Wards Cove about what exactly was
required to show the existence of an alternative employment practice, the Civil Rights Act of
1991 did not resolve the issue.
180. See Selmi, supra note 28, at 705.
181. See id. at 708-16.
182. See id. at 723.
183. See 422 U.S. at 408-09.
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rationales were likewise relatively easy to define.”184 When applied
in other contexts lacking these characteristics, however, the doctrine
does not fit well, and liability is far more difficult to prove. As a
result, very few disparate impact cases have been successful outside
of the specific contexts in which the doctrine developed.185
Similarly, traditional disparate impact doctrine is a poor fit for
addressing classification bias. Most data models have none of the
characteristics that Selmi identifies as making disparate impact
doctrine workable. Rather than providing specific selection criteria
that are justified by clearly stated rationales, data models typically
involve opaque decision processes, rest on unexplained correlations,
and lack clearly articulated employer justifications.
The written employment tests targeted in early disparate impact
litigation were grounded in psychological theories regarding ap-
titude and ability.186 These tests focused on identifying and mea-
suring skills or personal characteristics relevant to successful
performance of a job, and their validity could be evaluated in light
of standards set by an established scientific discipline.187 In con-
trast, data mining is entirely atheoretical.188 The models exploit
whatever data are available, rather than selecting which factors
should be included or controlled for based on theoretical expecta-
tions.189 As a result, if existing disparate impact doctrine is applied
184. Selmi, supra note 28, at 716. Once adopted, disparate impact doctrine came to be seen
as a generalized method of proving discrimination in situations far removed from seniority
systems and written tests. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-85
(1979) (applying disparate impact doctrine to claim that a transit authority’s regulation
prohibiting the use of narcotics by employees violated Title VII); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977) (applying disparate impact doctrine to claim that height and weight
requirements for employment discriminated against women).
185. See Selmi, supra note 28, at 739-43 (describing how intentional discrimination cases
may be easier to prove, with many cases asserting claims under both disparate impact and
disparate treatment doctrine, and succeeding on the disparate treatment claim but not on the
disparate impact claim); id. at 753 (“[O]utside of the testing cases, there has been no area
where the disparate impact theory has proved transformative or even particularly success-
ful.”).
186. See, e.g., Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 410-13 (1975) (challenging
employer use of Revised Beta Examination and Wonderlic Personnel Testing); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1971) (challenging employer use of Wonderlic Personnel Test
and Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test).
187. See Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15
(2016).
188. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part I.B.
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mechanically, it will fail to address the mechanics underlying classi-
fication bias.
A couple of examples are illustrative. Under disparate impact
doctrine, if a plaintiff shows that an employer practice has a
disproportionate impact on a protected group, the employer may
defend by showing that the practice is “job related ... and consistent
with business necessity.”190 If an employer could meet this burden
simply by showing that an algorithm rests on a statistical correla-
tion with some aspect of job performance, then the test is entirely
tautological, because, by definition, data mining is about uncovering
statistical correlations. Any reasonably constructed model will
satisfy the test, and the law would provide no effective check on
data-driven forms of bias. Similarly, in disparate impact cases
courts tend to defer to employer judgments about what abilities or
skills are necessary for a job when evaluating employer justifica-
tions for a practice.191 However, data mining models often rely on
“discovered” relationships between variables rather than measuring
previously identified job-related skills or attributes. When the
employer has not considered and clearly articulated the reasons for
relying on particular criteria, it is unclear why any deference is
warranted.
The differences between employment testing and data mining
also mean that defenses based on section 703(h) of Title VII do not
apply. That section excuses employers from liability for relying on
“any professionally developed ability test” so long as the test is “not
designed, intended or used to discriminate” on a protected basis.192
Algorithms used to sort or score workers are not “ability tests”
because they do not actually test ability—rather, they identify
behavioral markers that appear to correlate with on-the-job success.
The legislative history of section 703(h) indicates that Congress
added it to the statute to immunize the practice—common at the
time—of relying on standardized tests to select applicants for hire
or promotion.193 Reflecting this understanding, the Equal Employment
190. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
191. See Selmi, supra note 28, at 753; Wax, supra note 176, at 633-34.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
193. The version ultimately adopted made clear that reliance on these types of tests was
not permitted if “designed, intended or used to discriminate.” Id. The opinion in Griggs fo-
cused primarily on this language, adopting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
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Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, which interpret section 703(h), rely on and
incorporate standards regarding test validation established by the
American Psychological Association.194 Because the EEOC wrote
them to address an entirely different practice, those Guidelines are
simply irrelevant when evaluating the use of atheoretical data
mining models that result in classification bias.
To be clear, the concept of disparate impact—the idea that facially
neutral employer practices can have discriminatory effects—applies
to classification bias. The problem is that the ways the doctrine has
been applied in the past are not well suited to address the data-driv-
en nature of classification bias. Disparate impact theory can meet
these specific challenges; however, doing so will require some ad-
justments in how it applies to workforce analytics. Section C below
explains what types of adjustments are required, but first I consider
whether Title VII can be read to address classification bias directly.
B. A Closer Reading
The conventional reading of Title VII assumes that disparate
treatment and disparate impact exhaust the possibilities for proving
a violation under the statute. Scholars concerned about implicit
biases or workplace structures that disadvantage women or racial
minorities have either argued that the disparate treatment or dis-
parate impact theory ought to apply,195 or expressed concern that
neither theory fits.196 Similarly, Barocas and Selbst’s conclusion that
Title VII “would appear to bless” the use of data models even when
they produce discriminatory results197 rests on the assumption that
the only available alternatives are existing disparate treatment and
disparate impact doctrines.
interpretation that section 703(h) requires that any test be “job related” and not merely
professionally prepared. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
194. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975).
195. See, e.g., Green, supra note 48, at 145; Krieger, supra note 39, at 1231.
196. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Bottlenecks and Antidiscrimination Theory, 93 TEX.
L. REV. 415, 434-35 (2014) (reviewing JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014)); Sullivan, supra note 163, at 1000.
197. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 672.
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Perhaps, however, these two doctrines do not exhaust the options
for demonstrating the discrimination forbidden by Title VII. The
operative language of section 703 is divided into two parts:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.198
The conventional reading of section 703 is that (a)(1) is about
disparate treatment—which turns on motive199—whereas (a)(2) is
about disparate impact—which focuses on discriminatory effects.
This reading reflects the doctrinal superstructure that has devel-
198. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012). The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
contain nearly identical prohibitions. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4,
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2012); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202, 42
U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1)-(2). The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) similarly forbids “limit-
ing, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the
opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of ... disability.” See American
with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). However, the operative provisions
of the ADA differ from Title VII in other significant ways—for example, by making unlawful
an employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate otherwise qualified individuals with a
disability, and its use of “qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria
that screen out or tend to screen out” individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)-
(6). These differences may mean that the ADA applies to biased data models in different ways
than Title VII—a discussion that is beyond the scope of this Article.
199. Although the Supreme Court has at times suggested that disparate treatment cases
require proof of discriminatory motive, see, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (stating that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical” in dispa-
rate treatment cases), subsection 703(a)(1) does not refer to “intent” or “motive” at all. Rather,
interpretation of that provision hinges entirely on the words “because of.” As Noah Zatz ar-
gues, however, “because of” could be interpreted to mean many things other than “motivated
by.” See Noah D. Zatz, The Many Meanings of “Because Of”: A Comment on Inclusive Com-
munities Project, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 68, 68-69 (2015).
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oped around Title VII rather than a coherent underlying theory of
discrimination. As numerous scholars have pointed out, the distinc-
tion between disparate treatment and disparate impact is far from
clear, and the two theories overlap quite a bit both conceptually and
as a matter of proof.200 Nevertheless, the notion that disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact capture the entire meaning of subsec-
tions 703(a)(1) and (a)(2), respectively, is often an unquestioned
assumption.
However, the conventional reading does not inevitably flow from
the statutory language. Focusing on the text suggests that Title VII
also forbids what I have called classification bias—namely, the use
of classification schemes that have the effect of exacerbating in-
equality or disadvantage along lines of race, sex, or other protected
characteristics. The language of section 703(a)(2) specifically refers
to employer practices that “classify” employees in ways that “deprive
or tend to deprive” individuals of employment opportunities because
of protected characteristics.201 Obviously, Congress did not have in
mind the problem of biased data mining models when it enacted the
language of section 703(a)(2) in 1964. Nevertheless, the language
sweeps broadly enough to reach unanticipated employer practices
that exacerbate or entrench inequality on prohibited bases.
Differences in the texts of subsections 703(a)(1) and (a)(2) sup-
port the conclusion that section 703(a)(2) has broader reach than
section 703(a)(1). Section 703(a)(2) restricts an employer’s ability to
“limit, segregate, or classify” its employees or applicants.202 In con-
trast to section 703(a)(1), which focuses on actions, such as hiring,
firing, setting compensation, or terms and conditions that are taken
with respect to a particular employee, section 703(a)(2) focuses on
group-based actions—limiting, segregating, or classifying—all ac-
tions that necessarily are taken along some generalizable dimen-
sion. Importantly, the prohibited actions are not defined as limiting,
segregating, or classifying on the basis of race or other protected
characteristics. Instead, the emphasis of the language is on actions
(such as classifying) that “deprive or tend to deprive” employees of
opportunities on a protected basis.
200. See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341,
1343-44 (2010); Rutherglen, supra note 166, at 2322-23, 2325, 2327, 2329-30.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
202. See id.
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Many courts and commentators have simply assumed that section
703(a)(2) is synonymous with disparate impact doctrine. However,
the text of (a)(2) makes no mention of “disparate impact,” “discrimi-
natory effects,” “business necessity,” or “job relatedness.”203 These
concepts are codified in section 703(k), leaving open the possibility
that section 703(a)(2) has meaning beyond or apart from established
disparate impact doctrine.
When the Supreme Court first articulated the disparate impact
theory in Griggs, it was only loosely connected to the language of
section 703(a)(2).204 In framing the question presented—whether the
Duke Power Company’s high school diploma and testing require-
ments were lawful under Title VII—the Court dropped a footnote
citing to the language of section 703(a)(2).205 The Court made no
further mention of that particular statutory provision in the opinion.
Instead, the Court rested its analysis on Congress’s objective in
enacting Title VII—namely, “to achieve equality of employment op-
portunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employ-
ees.”206 The only part of the text of Title VII that the Court engaged
with at length was section 703(h), which permits employers to rely
on professionally developed ability tests so long as they are not
“designed, intended or used to discriminate.”207
Subsequent cases cited primarily to Griggs as authority for the
disparate impact doctrine,208 although the Court eventually ex-
plained that Griggs was grounded in the text of section 703(a)(2).209
203. See id.
204. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971).
205. Id. at 426 n.1.
206. Id. at 429-30.
207. See id. at 433 (emphasis removed) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)).
Duke Power Company argued that section 703(h) authorized its use of general intelligence
tests as a screening device. See id. Relying on guidance the EEOC had issued and the legis-
lative history of section 703(h), the Court concluded that the employer could not rely on the
provision to defend its testing requirement when the test was not job related. Id. at 433-36.
208. The next three disparate impact cases in the Supreme Court did not cite to section
703(a)(2) at all in the majority opinions. See generally N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
209. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988); see also Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235 (2005) (explaining that although Griggs “relied primarily
on the purposes of the Act,” the Court subsequently found that the disparate impact theory
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Some commentators questioned whether Title VII authorized
disparate impact claims at all,210 but those concerns became moot
when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.211 Congress
passed that legislation in response to several Supreme Court deci-
sions in the late 1980s that were widely criticized as interpreting
the protections of Title VII too narrowly.212
One of those cases was Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, a
disparate impact case involving two companies that operated sal-
mon canneries in remote areas of Alaska.213 The plaintiffs alleged
that the employers’ hiring and promotion practices had produced a
racially stratified workforce, in which skilled jobs (noncannery jobs)
were held predominantly by white workers, while unskilled jobs
(cannery jobs) were held predominantly by nonwhites.214 The Court
of Appeals found a prima facie case of disparate impact, but the Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the appeals court had relied on
the wrong statistics to conclude that a disparate impact existed.215
“represented the better reading of the statutory text as well”); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 445-47 (1982).
210. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2526 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he foundation on which the Court builds
its latest disparate-impact regime—Griggs v. Duke Power Co.—is made of sand.” (citation
omitted)); Nelson Lund, The Law of Affirmative Action in and After the Civil Rights Act of
1991: Congress Invites Judicial Reform, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 87, 94 (1997) (arguing that
there was no basis for the Supreme Court’s recognition of the disparate impact theory in
Griggs); see also Selmi, supra note 28, at 708-24 (detailing the origins of the disparate impact
cause of action).
211. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
212. See Sullivan, supra note 163, at 961 (“In reaction to Wards Cove and other decisions
issued during the 1988 Term of the Supreme Court, Congress passed, and President Bush
signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”).
213. See 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
214. See id. at 647-48.
215. See id. at 655. The Court held that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had erred by
comparing the percentage of nonwhite workers in the cannery and noncannery positions, and
concluding that the stark racial disparity between the two groups established a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination. Id. The relevant statistical comparison, the Court
explained, is “between the racial composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition
of the qualified ... population in the relevant labor market.” Id. at 650 (quoting Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (alterations in original)). Because the
cannery work force did not reflect the population of qualified workers for the noncannery jobs,
the statistical disparity in racial composition between the two groups did not establish a
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In remanding, the Court addressed several additional issues—argu-
ably all dicta—regarding disparate impact litigation. First, it stated
that plaintiffs must identify the specific employment practice that
created the alleged disparate impact as part of the prima facie
case.216 Second, it lowered the burden placed on the employer to
justify an employment practice—asking whether it “serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer”217
rather than whether it is job related or required by business
necessity, as it had in earlier cases.218 Finally, the Court reallocated
the burden of proving the lack of a business necessity to the
plaintiffs,219 which made it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish
liability by showing that a less discriminatory alternative existed
that the employer failed to adopt.220
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it responded
to the Court’s decision in Wards Cove by codifying the disparate
impact doctrine and overturning or rejecting some of the Court’s
guidance on disparate impact cases. It did so by placing the burden
on the employer to demonstrate that a challenged practice is “job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity,”221 and by making clear that if “the elements of a respon-
dent’s decision-making process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decision-making process may be analyzed as one
disparate impact. See id. at 651.
216. Id. at 656-58.
217. Id. at 659.
218. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977) (finding that “a
discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job
performance”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that in disparate
impact cases, “[t]he touchstone is business necessity”).
219. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. After a prima facie case of disparate impact is
established, “the employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business justification
for his employment practice,” but the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff. Id.
220. See id. at 661. The Court wrote that 
[A]ny alternative practices which respondents offer up ... must be equally effec-
tive as [the employer’s] chosen hiring procedures in achieving [its] legitimate
employment goals. Moreover, “[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of
proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether they
would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s
legitimate business goals.”
Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (fifth alteration in
original)).
221. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
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employment practice.”222 With regard to establishing liability by
showing the existence of an “alternative employment practice,” the
Act simply stated that such a showing “shall be in accordance with
the law as it existed on June 4, 1989”—the day before the Supreme
Court issued the Wards Cove decision—without trying to articulate
the correct standard.223
Congress made these changes by adding a new subsection (k),
which defined disparate impact liability, to section 703 of Title VII,
and retaining the language of section 703(a)(2) intact. After the
amendments, the statute continued to prohibit in section 703(a)(2)
limiting, segregating, or classifying employees in ways that “deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities”
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, separately
from the prohibition in section 703(k) of employment practices that
have a disparate impact. Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 left open
the possibility that the judicially elaborated theory of disparate
impact, as codified in section 703(k), does not exhaust the meaning
of section 703(a)(2).
Interestingly, dictum in the Court’s Wards Cove decision is
consistent with a reading that gives section 703(a)(2) meaning apart
from traditional disparate impact doctrine. Because the canneries
operated on a seasonal basis in a remote location, the employers
provided housing and meals. Cannery and noncannery workers were
assigned to separate dormitories and mess halls, which resulted in
racially stratified living and eating quarters. In passing, the
Supreme Court commented that the racially segregated facilities
could give rise to a separate claim under section 703(a)(2), apart
from the plaintiffs’ claim of disparate impact in hiring and promo-
tion.224 The Court’s language is admittedly ambiguous, but one way
222. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
223. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).
224. More specifically, the Court clarified the reach of its opinion in a footnote:
The Court of Appeals did not purport to hold that any specified employment
practice produced its own disparate impact that was actionable under Title VII.
This is not to say that a specific practice, such as nepotism, if it were proved to
exist, could not itself be subject to challenge if it had a disparate impact on
minorities. Nor is it to say that segregated dormitories and eating facilities in the
workplace may not be challenged under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) without
showing a disparate impact on hiring or promotion.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 655 n.9 (emphasis added).
In other words, even if no actionable disparate impact had produced the employer’s racially
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of reading it is that section 703(a)(2)’s meaning is not cabined by the
disparate impact doctrine.
In any case, the fact that Congress left section 703(a)(2) intact
when it responded to Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
supports the idea that (a)(2) continues to have independent force
apart from the traditional disparate impact theory codified in
subsection (k). Without the doctrinal elaboration of disparate impact
theory, the text of (a)(2) supports a finding that Title VII prohibits
classification bias.
C. Addressing Classification Bias
As discussed in Section III.B, Title VII could be read to directly
prohibit classification bias when algorithms operate to systemati-
cally disadvantage protected groups. Alternatively, disparate impact
doctrine might be adjusted in ways that address those concerns. In
either case, an effective legal response will require developing the
doctrine to meet the particular challenges posed by data-driven
discrimination. This Section sketches what a legal prohibition of
classification bias looks like and how it should differ from tradi-
tional disparate impact doctrine.
As a preliminary note, this exploration focuses on employer liabil-
ity, leaving aside the question whether vendors who create these
models and sell or license them to employers should bear any legal
responsibility. Although Title VII does apply to employment agen-
cies,225 it is highly uncertain whether that provision reaches ven-
dors. I do not attempt to answer that question here, focusing instead
on how Title VII might be applied to employers to address classifica-
tion bias caused by workplace analytics. Regardless of whether
vendors are directly liable, employers who face potential legal
responsibility will have an incentive to pressure vendors to avoid
biased outcomes.
stratified workforce, the plaintiffs might still be able to use section 703(a)(2) to challenge the
employer’s use of a classification (cannery versus noncannery workers) that adversely affected
the employees’ status. In that case, the harm suffered by the workers was the segregated
living and dining quarters, and the violation occurred because the employer relied on a
neutral classification that had the effect of depriving individual workers of opportunities or
status because of their race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b).
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Prohibiting classification bias requires examining the actual
impact of the algorithms used to sort applicants and employees, and
asking whether they deprive individuals of employment opportuni-
ties along lines of race, sex, or other protected characteristics.226
Like traditional disparate impact doctrine, classification bias
focuses on facially neutral employment practices that have dispro-
portionately adverse effects on disadvantaged groups.227 And like
disparate impact doctrine, classification bias is not concerned with
employer intent or motive.228 If an employer relies on a data-driven
classification scheme to sort applicants or employees, then it should
be responsible for the impact that selection device has on the
opportunities of workers in protected classes.
Given the differing reasons that data analytics may produce
biased outcomes, an effective legal response must differ from
traditional disparate impact doctrine in a number of ways. First, the
law should not require employers to purge sensitive information,
such as race and sex, from datasets; instead, preserving such data
is important to avoid bias. Second, the method of identifying the
relevant labor market for statistical comparison should look quite
different. Third, an employer’s defense of an algorithm with biased
effects should depend, not on a claim of job-relatedness, but on the
employer proving that the underlying model is statistically valid
and substantively meaningful. Fourth, unlike under traditional
disparate impact doctrine, employers should be able to rely on a
“bottom-line” defense.
1. Data on Protected Class Characteristics
Understanding the sources of classification bias suggests quite
different rules regarding information about protected characteristics
such as race and sex. A formalist reading of Title VII might appear
226. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
227. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988); Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
228. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 988 (“This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that
some facially neutral employment practices may violate Title VII even in the absence of a
demonstrated discriminatory intent.” (emphasis added)); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (“Under
[Title VII], practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices.” (emphasis added)).
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to prohibit any use of variables capturing sensitive characteristics
in a data model.229 Certainly, a simple model that relied on race or
other protected characteristics as the basis for adverse decisions
would run afoul of Title VII’s prohibitions. However, when dealing
with a complex statistical model involving multiple variables, the
appropriate treatment of these sensitive variables is more compli-
cated. If the goal is to reduce biased outcomes, then a simple
prohibition on using data about race or sex could be either wholly
ineffective or actually counterproductive due to the existence of class
proxies and the risk of omitted variable bias.230 Instead, avoiding
classification bias may sometimes call for excluding sensitive demo-
graphic variables and at other times call for including them. Any
response to biased data models must be sensitive to these nuances.
Regardless of whether a particular model should include variables
for protected characteristics, preventing classification bias requires
that, at the very least, model creators preserve these data when
they are already present in the training data.231 If developers purge
demographic variables such as race and sex from the dataset, it
becomes more difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a
model is systematically biased. Preserving these variables allows a
model to be tested to determine its effect on the distribution of op-
portunities among different groups. Thus, unlike standard readings
of Title VII which might suggest that data on sensitive characteris-
tics should be disregarded or deleted,232 a focus on classification bias
argues for preserving this data and using it to assess the risks that
a model produces biased outcomes.
2. Relevant Labor Market Statistics
The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of identifying the
correct labor pool for comparison purposes when using statistical
229. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 694-95.
230. See supra Part I.B.
231. See Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 5, at 37 (arguing that having data about legally
protected characteristics is necessary to avoid unintended biased outcomes); cf. Uniform
Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15 (2016) (requiring
employers to maintain records and disclose the impact of tests and other selection procedures
on employment opportunities).
232. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 694-95.
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evidence to establish disparate impact.233 According to the Court,
the “proper comparison [is] between the racial composition of [the
at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of the qualified ... popula-
tion in the relevant labor market.”234 This requirement has led to
conflicts in particular cases over how to define the comparison
pool—for example, what indicia should be used to identify “quali-
fied” applicants and what geographic area constitutes the “relevant
labor market.”235 How a court resolves these questions can deter-
mine whether complainants are successful in establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination.236
The search for the proper comparator group makes sense when
trying to diagnose whether an independently developed selection
device, such as a written ability test, will have a disproportionate
impact when a particular employer administers it. With data
mining, however, the employment practice at issue—the predictive
model—is derived from preexisting data about large numbers of
individuals who are taken to be representative of the target popula-
tion. By constructing the model from the data, the data miners
implicitly assume that the dataset used to train the model is
complete enough and accurate enough to identify meaningful pat-
terns among applicants or employees. If the operation of the model
on the training data demonstrates an adverse effect on a protected
class, that showing should be sufficient to establish a prima facie
case. A court should not require a complainant to collect additional
233. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Tex.
Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015);
Watson, 487 U.S. at 997; N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1979).
234. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 308 (1977) (alterations in original)).
235. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (“The appellants argue that
a showing of disproportionate impact on women based on generalized national statistics
should not suffice to establish a prima facie case.... There is no requirement, however, that
a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the
characteristics of actual applicants.”); In re Emp’t Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d
1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The focus during this first stage of the inquiry, and indeed
during the whole of the disparate impact analysis, is on defining the qualified applicant
pool.”).
236. See, e.g., Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1554-55, 1557 (11th Cir.
1994); Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1555 (11th Cir. 1985).
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data about some relevant comparator pool to establish the adverse
effects of the model.
On the other hand, even if a model does not exhibit discriminato-
ry effects when run on the training data, that fact cannot be taken
as conclusive evidence that outcomes will be unbiased when a
particular employer applies the model in the real world. If the data
relied on to build the model were not sufficiently representative or
accurate, the model may be statistically biased in ways that
systematically disadvantage certain groups when applied to actual
applicants or employees. Thus, courts should also permit complain-
ants to demonstrate that the operation of the model on real cases
produces biased outcomes.
3. Employer Justifications
Under disparate impact doctrine, an employer may defend
against a prima facie showing of disparate impact by demonstrating
that the challenged practice is “job related ... and consistent with
business necessity.”237 The exact meaning of this phrase is ambigu-
ous, and the standard has proven difficult to apply consistently in
practice.238 When applied to data analytics, however, it is difficult to
make sense of the standard at all. When an algorithm relies on
seemingly arbitrary characteristics or behaviors interacting in some
complex way to predict job performance, the claim that it is “job re-
lated” often reduces to the fact that there is an observed statistical
correlation. If a statistical correlation were sufficient to satisfy the
defense of job-relatedness, the standard would be a tautology rather
than a meaningful legal test. In order to protect against discrimina-
tory harms, something more must be required to justify the use of
an algorithm that produces biased outcomes.
As discussed in Part I.C, error-ridden, biased, or unrepresentative
data, or improper specification of variables can introduce statistical
bias, undermining the accuracy of a data model. When these
statistical biases coincide with class membership, reliance on the
model can harm members of protected groups. In order for claim-
ants to diagnose whether statistical bias has infected an algorithm,
237. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
238. See Selmi, supra note 28, at 721-24; Wax, supra note 176, at 628, 631-36.
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they would need access to the training data and the underlying
model. The claimants would have to trace how the data miners
collected the data, determine what populations were sampled, and
audit the records for errors. Conducting these types of checks for a
dataset created by aggregating multiple, unrelated data sources
containing hundreds of thousands of bits of information would be a
daunting task for even the best-resourced plaintiffs. In addition, the
algorithm’s creators are likely to claim that both the training data
and the algorithm itself are proprietary information. Thus, if the
law required complainants to prove the source of bias, they would
face insurmountable obstacles.
Given these hurdles and the employer’s superior access to
information about the model’s construction, employers should bear
the burden of establishing the model’s validity. The existence of a
statistical correlation should not be sufficient. Instead, because the
employer’s justification for using an algorithm amounts to a claim
that it actually predicts something relevant to the job, the employer
should carry the burden of demonstrating that statistical bias does
not plague the underlying model. In other words, the employer
should have to defend the accuracy of the correlations it relies on by
showing that no problems exist with the data or model construction
that are biasing the results, and not simply by showing a statistical
correlation in the existing data.
If an employer were able to satisfy this burden—if we could be
certain that no statistical biases affected the model—should that be
sufficient to justify reliance on an algorithm, even if it produces
biased outcomes? In other words, should an employer be permitted
to use a model that creates structural disadvantage if it is clear that
it is not caused by statistical bias? Answering that question turns
on the legitimacy of the employer’s justification for using the model.
And making that judgment requires knowing something about what
the model is measuring and how it relates to the particular job.
When applied to data analytics, however, two distinct problems
arise. The first is the issue of interpretability. The second is the
difficulty of distinguishing meaningful from spurious correlations.
The problem of interpretability arises because the atheoretical
nature of data mining and the availability of unguided machine-
learning techniques often make it difficult to know what factors are
driving outcomes. An algorithm may be a “black box” that sorts
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applicants or employees and predicts who is most promising,
without specifying what characteristics or qualities it is looking for.
It may, for example, be trained simply to look for applicants who
resemble individuals hired in the past. Alternatively, the target
variable might be clearly defined—as, for example, when an
employer seeks employees who will maximize sales or have the
longest job tenure—but it may not be possible to identify which
particular attributes or variables are driving the algorithm or to
determine how they are weighted.
Even when a model is interpretable, its meaning may not be
clear. Two variables may be strongly correlated in the data, but the
existence of a statistical relationship does not tell us if the variables
are causally related, or are influenced by some common unobserv-
able factor, or are completely unrelated. For example, one study
found that employees who installed new web browsers on their
computers rather than using preinstalled software stayed longer on
the job.239 But it is unclear why this correlation exists. It is possible,
although unlikely, that not using the default browser makes an
employee more dedicated. More likely, some unobserved attribute
leads some individuals to choose a nonstandard browser, and also
affects their longevity on the job. Or, it could be that the observed
relationship between browser choice and productivity is entirely
coincidental. Other correlations seem much more likely to be
spurious—an artifact of the data mining process rather than a
meaningful relationship—such as the apparent correlation between
“liking” curly fries on Facebook and higher intelligence.240
Given the significant risks that biased algorithms will reproduce
or entrench existing disadvantage, employers should bear the
burden of justifying their use when they have disproportionate
effects on protected groups. When a model is interpretable, debate
may ensue over whether its use is justified, but it is at least possible
to have a conversation about whether relying on the behaviors or
attributes that drive the outcomes is normatively acceptable. When
a model is not interpretable, however, it is not even possible to have
239. See Joe Pinsker, People Who Use Firefox or Chrome Are Better Employees, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/people-who-use-firefox-
or-chrome-are-better-employees/387781/ [https://perma.cc/4ZAA-LFLS].
240. See Kosinski et al., supra note 62, at 5804.
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the conversation. In such a case, the employer should not be able to
justify its use merely because it captures a statistical relationship.
4. The Bottom-Line Defense
Another way that Title VII doctrine should be adjusted is to allow
employers a bottom-line defense when an algorithm is part of a
larger selection process that is not biased overall. In 1982 the
Supreme Court rejected the “bottom-line defense” in a disparate
impact case, Connecticut v. Teal.241 The plaintiffs in Teal alleged
that their employer had violated Title VII by using a written exam
that had a disparate impact on black employees as the first step in
a promotion process.242 Because black and white employees had
significantly different passing rates, the proportion of black
employees who continued to be eligible for promotion was much
lower than that of white employees. When the employer later pro-
moted some of these employees, it over selected black employees
from among the eligible candidates. The end result was that 22.9
percent of the black employees who initially took the test were
ultimately promoted, as compared with 13.5 percent of white
employees.243
The employer argued that this “bottom-line” result, in which
black employees were promoted at higher rates than white employ-
ees, should be a defense to the plaintiffs’ Title VII suit.244 The
Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, rejected the employer’s
argument on the grounds that the goal of Title VII, as interpreted
in Griggs, is “to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers” to equality.245 In the Court’s view, the ultimate
outcome of the promotion process was irrelevant because the
plaintiffs’ claim was that they were denied “the opportunity to
compete equally with white workers on the basis of job-related
criteria.”246 The Court also argued that the focus of the statute’s
protection was the individual, not groups, and therefore, Title VII
241. 457 U.S. 440, 442, 452-56 (1982).
242. Id. at 443-44.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 452-53.
245. See id. at 448 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
246. Id. at 451.
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required the employer to afford each applicant an equal opportunity
to compete.247
Regardless of whether the Court’s rejection of the bottom-line
defense made sense given the facts in Teal, addressing classification
bias calls for a different approach. It is possible that relying on
certain elements or factors in a data model may tend to disadvan-
tage a protected group, but those effects might disappear when they
are part of a more complex model that allows for interactions among
multiple factors. Thus, including race or sex as a variable might not
cause an overall discriminatory effect at all. In some circumstances,
including these variables might even make the model less likely to
have a discriminatory effect—thereby contributing to a more equal
bottom line. Similarly, the inclusion of some neutral variables may
bias outcomes based on protected characteristics but will not always
do so, depending on the overall structure of the model. Because
isolating the effect of particular variables is difficult, treating the
algorithm as an undifferentiated whole will often make sense. And
if the algorithm’s operation does not disproportionately exclude
members of protected groups, then no discriminatory harm has
occured.
What if the operation of an algorithm produces biased outcomes,
but the model’s predictions are only one input in the employer’s
selection process, and, in the end, there is no disparate effect on a
protected class? In that case, should the law still hold the employer
responsible for relying on a biased data model as part of its process?
In the context of workforce analytics, permitting a bottom-line de-
fense makes sense. First, as discussed above, when dealing with
algorithms plagued by statistical bias or reproducing structural
disadvantage, the harm is systemic rather than individual.248 Given
that the central concern is with workplace systems that disadvan-
tage certain groups, those concerns are alleviated when the
operation of the system as a whole does not produce biased out-
comes.
More practically, allowing employers a bottom-line defense is
more likely to encourage equality-promoting uses of data. If em-
ployers are potentially liable for biased effects at each step of their
247. Id. at 453-56.
248. See supra Part I.C.
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hiring or promotion process, they will have little incentive for self-
examination or evaluation of the structural impact of their choices.
Instead, they are likely either to ignore the risk that algorithms can
cause bias or simply to cease using data analytics altogether. In
contrast, a legal regime that permits a bottom-line defense will
encourage employers to audit the impact of selection tools—in-
cluding decision-making algorithms—on their workforce composi-
tion and to create processes that produce less biased results overall.
* * * 
Thus far, this Part has considered how the law should look
different from existing doctrine in order to respond to the equality
challenges posed by workforce analytics. As explained, the law will
have to depart from traditional disparate impact doctrine in
significant ways in order to respond effectively. It might do so by
recognizing classification bias as a separate type of harm prohibited
by Title VII, or, alternatively, by adjusting disparate impact
doctrine to be more responsive to the particular risks posed by
discriminatory algorithms. Whether framed in terms of a prohibi-
tion on classification bias or a revised disparate impact theory, the
critical point is that data analytics differ significantly from the
employer practices challenged in earlier cases, and thus require a
legal response adapted to those particular risks. 
D. A Note on Ricci v. DeStefano
The previous Section discussed how Title VII might be applied in
ways better suited to meet the challenges to equality posed by work-
force analytics. In this Section, I consider whether anything in exist-
ing Title VII doctrine would preclude such a development. More
specifically, some commentators have interpreted the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano as casting doubt on the
viability of disparate impact theory—and by implication, any
doctrine that looks at the disparate effects of employer practices.249
These concerns raise the question: does the Court’s holding in Ricci
bar the development of Title VII doctrine in ways that can meet the
249. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 200, at 1344, 1363.
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risks of classification bias? For reasons I explain below, I believe the
answer is clearly “no.” And for the same reasons, Title VII—read as
a whole—should pose no barrier to employers’ voluntary use of data
analytics to try to diagnose and reduce structural forms of bias.
The dispute in Ricci arose when the City of New Haven, Connecti-
cut, refused to certify the results of promotional exams.250 After
administering the written portion, the City realized that the exams
would have a racially disparate impact if certified: virtually all of
the promotions would go to white firefighters, even though a
significant proportion of the candidate pool was black or Hispanic.251
Concerned about a possible disparate impact lawsuit if it made the
promotions, the City decided not to certify the results.252 Some of the
firefighters who believed that they would have been promoted sued
the City.253 These firefighters alleged that the City’s refusal to use
the test results constituted a form of disparate treatment discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause
because the City had considered the racial impact of the tests in
making its decision.
In Ricci, the five-justice majority accepted the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that the City’s decision to discard the test results violated
Title VII’s disparate treatment prohibition with very little discus-
sion.254 The majority summarily rejected the district court’s
reasoning that the City’s motivation of avoiding disparate impact
liability did not constitute discriminatory intent. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy explained, “Our analysis begins with this
premise: The City’s actions would violate the disparate-treatment
prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense.”255 In the
250. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 562-63 (2009).
251. “Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination—43 whites, 19
blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed—25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispan-
ics.” Id. at 566. The top ten candidates were eligible to fill eight vacant lieutenant positions.
Id. All ten candidates were white. Id. “Forty-one candidates completed the captain examina-
tion—25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed—16 whites, 3
blacks, and 3 Hispanics.” Id. The top nine candidates were eligible to fill seven vacant captain
positions. Id. Seven of the candidates were white, and two were Hispanic. Id.
252. See id. at 562 (describing how the City threw out the examinations after some
firefighters threatened to sue the City if it promoted firefighters on the basis of the tests).
253. Id. at 562-63.
254. See id. at 579-80.
255. Id. at 579.
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majority’s view, the fact that the City accounted for the racially
disparate results made its decision a form of intentional discrimina-
tion, such that Title VII’s disparate treatment and disparate impact
prohibitions appeared to be in conflict.256
From this starting premise, the majority’s analysis turned to
whether the City had a lawful justification for taking the action it
did. The Court rejected the City’s argument that its good faith belief
that using the exams would be a disparate impact violation justified
discarding the test results.257 The majority also rejected the plain-
tiffs’ position that an employer may never take race-conscious
actions even if the employer knows that it would otherwise violate
disparate impact.258 Instead, the majority concluded that the City
must have “a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to
disparate-impact liability” to justify its actions.259 Examining the
record evidence, the majority concluded that New Haven lacked the
requisite “strong basis in evidence,” finding the exams “job related”
and “consistent with business necessity.”260 The majority therefore
held that discarding the test results violated Title VII.261
In the wake of Ricci, some commentators have suggested that
disparate impact faces an existential threat.262 If disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact are in conflict, and if the Equal Protec-
tion Clause forbids disparate treatment, then is the disparate
impact prohibition itself unconstitutional? Justice Scalia clearly
256. See id. at 579-80.
257. Id. at 581-82.
258. See id. at 580.
259. Id. at 585.
260. See id. at 587.
261. Id. at 592.
262. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and
Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115,
1126-27 (2016); Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection,
2008-2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 55; Eang L. Ngov, When “The Evil Day” Comes, Will Title
VII’s Disparate Impact Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause
Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 538-39 (2011); Primus, supra note 200, at 1343-44; Law-
rence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2161-62 (2013); see also
Richard A. Primus, Of Visible Race-Consciousness and Institutional Role: Equal Protection
and Disparate Impact After Ricci and Inclusive Communities, in TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 67TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 295, 295-96 (Anne Marie Lofaso & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2015)
(concluding in light of the Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities that the statutory dispar-
ate impact standard will survive constitutional scrutiny given the current Court composition).
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intended to signal a looming constitutional issue in his concurring
opinion;263 however, the rest of the Justices were content to argue
the merits in Ricci on purely statutory grounds.264 This approach is
sensible because there is a vast difference between a constitutional
prohibition on race-based state action and the conclusion that
Congress cannot require employers to dismantle practices that oper-
ate as “built-in headwinds” for disadvantaged minority groups.265
Despite the alarms, Ricci can easily be read as consistent with the
continuing constitutionality of disparate impact liability under Title
VII.266 In Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing
Act.267 This decision suggests that the theory will likely remain
viable even if subject to a direct constitutional challenge.268
Putting aside the constitutional question—as the Court did in
Ricci—the question is whether prohibiting classification bias that
results from data models would conflict with Title VII’s prohibition
on intentional discrimination. The Justices in Ricci divided five to
four over how to frame the question before the Court. While five
Justices started from the premise that disparate treatment and
disparate impact obligations were in conflict in the case,269 the four
dissenting Justices saw no conflict at all.270 Justice Ginsburg, who
authored the dissent, argued that the best reading of Title VII un-
derstands the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories as
working in concert to achieve the statute’s purposes of “ending
workplace discrimination and promoting genuinely equal opportu-
263. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[R]esolution of this dispute merely
postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to
what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”).
264. See id. at 576-78, 584 (majority opinion).
265. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
266. See Primus, supra note 200, at 1374-75 (arguing that disparate impact doctrine will
survive constitutional challenge under two of three proposed readings of Ricci); cf. In re Emp’t
Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that Title
VII’s disparate impact provisions are a valid exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power).
267. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
268. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 262, at 1127-28; Primus, supra note 262, at 295-96.
269. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580.
270. See id. at 624-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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nity.”271 In the view of the dissenting Justices, the employer who
rejects criteria that systematically disadvantage minorities “due to
reasonable doubts about their reliability can hardly be held to have
engaged in discrimination ‘because of ’ race.”272
Thus, the Justices were closely divided on whether discarding
New Haven’s promotional exams constituted disparate treatment.
An even stronger case can be made that abandoning a data model
that produces racially biased results is not a form of disparate treat-
ment. Richard Primus argues that one plausible reading of Ricci is
that the City’s actions constituted disparate treatment because they
“adversely affected specific and visible innocent parties.”273 Certain-
ly Primus is right that protecting the expectations of the plaintiffs
was a significant concern for the Justices in the majority. Justice
Kennedy wrote that the City “create[d] legitimate expectations” in
the firefighters who took the tests.274 Some, he noted, “invested sub-
stantial time, money, and personal commitment in preparing.”275
The problem arose because once the City established and announced
the selection process, invalidating the test results upset legitimate
expectations.276 Justice Alito, in his concurrence, similarly empha-
sized the personal sacrifices that individual plaintiffs made to quali-
fy for promotion—one firefighter hired someone to read and record
the study materials because he was dyslexic, and another gave up
a part-time job in order to study.277
271. See id. at 624.
272. Id. at 625.
273. Primus, supra note 200, at 1362. Some commentators have argued that the challeng-
ers were not in fact “victims” at all. See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[The white firefighters] had no vested right to promotion.”); see also Mark S. Brodin, Ricci
v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & the Triumph of White Privilege, 20 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161, 181, 202-12 (2011). Regardless, Primus is correct that the majority
in Ricci viewed the challengers as victims because they relied on a process announced in
advance. See Primus, supra note 200, at 1372-73.
274. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583 (majority opinion).
275. Id. at 583-84.
276. See id. at 583-84, 593 (“The injury arises in part from the high, and justified,
expectations of the candidates who had participated in the testing process on the terms the
City had established for the promotional process.”). Contra id. at 630 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (“The legitimacy of an employee’s expectation depends on the legitimacy of the
selection method.”).
277. See id. at 607 (Alito, J., concurring).
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This reading of Ricci—that the disparate treatment violation
occurred because the City’s action created “visible victims”278—is not
only consistent with the language of the opinions, but it also best
fits the statutory language. Title VII does not forbid any employer
decision just because it is made with an awareness of race. Instead,
it forbids “adverse employment actions” taken “because of an
individual’s race.”279 Unlike the situation in Ricci, prohibiting the
use of a biased algorithm does not constitute a disparate treatment
violation because there has been no adverse employment action. No
employee has been deprived of a job to which he is entitled because
no employee has any right or legitimate expectation that an
employer will use any particular model. Because data mining
models are atheoretical and typically based on past behavioral
observations,280 applicants are unlikely to know exactly which
factors weigh into the model, and so they cannot argue that they
relied on the process. The applicant who might have been selected
if the employer had used a data mining model that it chose to
discard is thus in an entirely different position from the white
firefighters in Ricci who studied in reliance on the announced test.
With no reliance interest and no entitlement that the employer use
any particular model, employees who might have been hired if a
biased model was used have no plausible claim that they have
suffered discrimination.
Because disparate treatment violations occur only when employ-
ees’ legitimate entitlements are disrupted, nothing in Ricci pre-
cludes interpreting Title VII to prohibit classification bias, nor
would the decision prohibit employer attempts to identify and avoid
such bias. Barocas and Selbst thus overstate the matter when they
suggest that any legislation directed at reducing biased models
might “run afoul of Ricci.”281 They argue that attempts to regulate
data mining are problematic because diagnosing the impact of a
model requires taking protected class characteristics into account.282
As explained above, however, the problem in Ricci was not that the
278. See Primus, supra note 200, at 1345, 1369-75.
279. Civil Right Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
280. See supra Part I.
281. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 725.
282. See id. at 725-26.
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City took action with an awareness of its racial impact, but that the
action entailed adverse employment actions against identifiable
persons. Merely being aware of the racial consequences of a selec-
tion process does not constitute disparate treatment. Similarly, an
employer’s efforts to understand the racial consequences of its
processes in order to avoid bias does not violate Title VII.
Even the five Justices who disapproved of the City’s actions in
Ricci agreed on this point. As Justice Kennedy wrote, “Title VII does
not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a
test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to
provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their
race.”283 And, of course, the only way to ensure that a test is fair
regardless of race is to pay attention to race. The clear implication
is that mere race-consciousness in developing a selection criterion
is not a violation of Title VII. Rather, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized that voluntary compliance by employers is
“the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII”284 and
“essential to the statutory scheme.”285 As the majority in Ricci
recognized, unless employers can act to avoid practices that have a
disparate impact, the voluntary compliance efforts that Title VII
calls for would come “to a near standstill.”286
Barocas and Selbst also erroneously suggest that Ricci poses an
obstacle to crafting a remedy for biased classification schemes.287
They argue that “[a]fter an employer begins to use the model to
make hiring decisions, only a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that the
employer will be successfully sued for disparate impact will permit
corrective action.”288 However, nothing in Ricci prevents a court
283. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009); id. at 628-29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the statute ‘should not be read to thwart’ efforts
at voluntary compliance. Such compliance, we have explained, is ‘the preferred means of
achieving [Title VII’s] objectives.’” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (first
quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987); and then quoting Local No. 93,
Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986))).
284. Id. at 581 (majority opinion) (quoting Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 515).
285. Id. at 583 (“The standard leaves ample room for employers’ voluntary compliance
efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme and to Congress’ efforts to eradicate
workplace discrimination.”).
286. Id. at 581.
287. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 725-26.
288. Id. at 726.
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from enjoining the use of a biased model, or an employer from vol-
untarily ceasing to use the discriminatory algorithm once that bias
has been detected. The majority in Ricci objected to undoing the
results of the test once the employer announced and administered
it;289 the Court did not require the City to continue using the test
results to make future promotion decisions. To suggest otherwise
would lead to the absurd result that an employer, who ordinarily
has a great deal of discretion to change its selection processes or
criteria, would suddenly be prohibited from changing a practice the
moment it learned that it had a disparate effect on a protected
group. Such an outcome would produce the exact opposite effect that
Congress intended Title VII to have—namely, it would freeze into
place employer practices that work to systematically disadvantage
minority applicants and employees. The way to avoid such an
absurd result is to recognize that acting prospectively to prevent
classification bias is not a form of intentional discrimination.
A remedy limited to prospective relief is entirely consistent with
Ricci. Because applicants and employees have no entitlement that
an employer will continue to use any particular selection device,290
the employer harms no one if it discards one practice in favor of a
different one. Things would be more complicated if a remedy re-
quired the employer to fire current employees who were hired using
a biased selection device, but that has not been the type of remedy
required in successful disparate impact suits, nor should it be a
remedy in cases of classification bias. For similar reasons, employ-
ers would not run afoul of Title VII by voluntarily avoiding models
that produce biased results. An employer might not be permitted to
fire an employee solely because she was selected using a biased data
model. However, Title VII should not be read to prohibit the
employer from ceasing to use that model once it discovers the bias.
E. The Limits of the Liability Model
Prohibiting classification schemes that disadvantage protected
classes is a promising avenue for addressing the equality concerns
raised by workforce analytics. Such an approach is grounded in the
289. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585.
290. See id.
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text of Title VII and consistent with the statute’s purpose. Because
the risks posed by workforce analytics stem from different sources
than traditional forms of workplace testing,291 it makes sense to
tailor the doctrine to those particular risks rather than to mechani-
cally apply the details of disparate impact doctrine that were
developed in a different context. However, relying on the threat of
legal liability to prevent classification bias has limitations as well.
In order to enforce its prohibitions on employment discrimination,
Title VII relies on both individual and agency enforcement. After
exhausting the administrative process, individual workers can file
suit under Title VII and seek injunctive and monetary relief.292
Under the current version of the law, a successful complainant is
entitled to lost wages and other forms of equitable relief, compensa-
tory damages, punitive damages (in cases in which the defendant
acted with malice or reckless indifference), and attorneys’ fees.293
The law caps the total amount of compensatory and punitive
damages based on the size of the employer.294 This remedial
structure is intended in part to incentivize aggrieved individuals to
enforce the prohibition against employment discrimination.
In addition to individual suits, the EEOC also has enforcement
powers.295 The EEOC has authority to receive, investigate, and
conciliate charges of discrimination under Title VII and other
antidiscrimination statutes. In cases in which the EEOC has found
cause to believe discrimination occurred but was unable to resolve
the dispute through informal conciliation, the EEOC may choose to
file suit on behalf of a complaining party.296
For several reasons, this scheme may be less effective at enforcing
a prohibition on classification bias, as compared with other types of
discrimination. First, as previously discussed, the harms that
classification bias causes are structural rather than individual in
nature.297 Because the harms are more diffuse, individuals will find
it extremely difficult to detect when a biased algorithm has
291. See supra Part I.B.
292. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012).
293. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
294. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
295. See id. § 2000e-5.
296. See id. § 2000e-5(f).
297. See supra Part I.C.
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produced an adverse outcome and to understand what caused the
model to be biased. Even if these obstacles are overcome, the ap-
propriate remedy would be structural in nature—namely, an injunc-
tion to revise or eliminate use of a biased model.298 The reduced
chance of receiving damages makes it less likely that individual em-
ployees will step forward to challenge instances of classification
bias.
Individual complainants may not be reliable enforcers of a
prohibition on classification bias for another reason. Detecting and
pursuing claims of classification bias will be highly resource- and
time-intensive. Even with a favorable legal regime, plaintiffs will
need experts to determine whether data models are producing
biased outcomes. Most individual plaintiffs will simply be finan-
cially unable to pursue such a case, particularly when the likelihood
of a large damage award is slim.
The EEOC might step into the breach, as it often does, by
litigating cases that have the potential for significant public impact,
but that private litigants are unlikely to pursue.299 Even if the
EEOC makes these cases a priority, however, its limited resources
will significantly constrain its efforts. Currently, the EEOC receives
nearly 100,000 new charges annually and it faces a persistent
backlog of charges.300 The EEOC’s current strategic priorities in-
clude cases involving systemic discrimination.301 That focus would
seem to encompass the structural harms threatened by employer
reliance on biased data models. If the EEOC decides to prioritize
cases involving workforce analytics, it would need to develop
methods for detecting when data algorithms are producing discrimi-
natory outcomes. Doing so would require a level of technical exper-
tise and fiscal resources even beyond what is currently needed to
tackle large scale systemic cases.302
Lowering the standards for establishing liability or increasing the
available remedies could resolve the problem of insufficient incen-
tives for private litigants to file suit. If the law swings too sharply
298. See supra Parts I.C, III.D.
299. See Pauline T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Discrimination: Public Enforcement and the
Role of the EEOC, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1133, 1141-46 (2015).
300. See id. at 1144.
301. See id. at 1141-42.
302. Cf. id. at 1145-46.
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in that direction, however, it may deter employers from attempting
to understand whether their data tools have any disparate effects,
and they may prefer instead to remain ignorant of any biases those
tools may be causing. Alternatively, employers may cease using data
models altogether, even though data analytics might help to
diagnose and correct existing cognitive or structural biases. Thus,
the goal of the law should not be to eliminate the use of all data
analytics. Instead, the optimal legal regime would deter the use of
biased data models while permitting or encouraging equality-
promoting uses of data. The difficulty of balancing these two goals
under Title VII suggests that policymakers may need to look beyond
a backward-looking, liability-based regime and to consider other
regulatory responses.
Fully exploring alternative regimes goes beyond the scope of this
Article, but a few examples are illustrative. Technological innova-
tions may make it possible to limit in advance whether a computer
will produce an algorithm with a disparate effect on a protected
class.303 Another possibility would be to develop an ex ante regula-
tory regime to govern algorithms like the one currently used for
premarket approval of drugs.304 An appropriately structured approv-
al process could ensure that data mining models are not statistically
biased and that the social costs of using them do not exceed the
benefits. Alternatively, a regulatory body might work to develop
standards relating to data collection, integrity and preservation, and
model validity, such that models that complied with these standards
would have a presumption of legality.
None of these alternatives is simple or guaranteed to work, and
all are likely to generate resistance. Implementing any of these
solutions would require resolving difficult questions about what
kinds of bias are unfair and how much should be tolerated. But
303. See, e.g., Sara Hajian & Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Direct and Indirect Discrimination
Prevention Methods, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra
note 56, at 241, 247-51; Faisal Kamiran, Toon Calders & Mykola Pechenizkiy, Techniques for
Discrimination-Free Predictive Models, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY, supra note 56, at 223, 229-35; Kroll et al., supra note 5 (manuscript at 35-45).
304. Cf. Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 20-25), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747994 [https://perma.cc/2WCH-WMB9]
(arguing for a federal regulatory agency to ensure the safety and efficacy of algorithms before
they are introduced in the market).
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these types of efforts might offer some kind of safe harbor to em-
ployers who, acting in good faith, attempt to leverage data to remove
bias from their personnel practices.
CONCLUSION
The data revolution is here to stay. Advances in computing power
and the availability of massive amounts of data make it inevitable
that employers will harness these tools to manage their workforces.
Depending on how employers deploy these tools, data may enhance
workplace fairness or exacerbate inequality. When these tools are
used—not as guides or aids, but as gatekeepers to critical employ-
ment opportunities—they risk reinforcing existing patterns of disad-
vantage. Because of the nature of data mining techniques, employer
reliance on these tools poses novel challenges to workplace equality
and thus traditional doctrine will not suffice to address them. 
Thinking in terms of classification bias offers a lens through
which to better understand these challenges and to consider how to
develop an appropriate legal response. Although the term may
sound novel, a legal prohibition of classification bias is grounded in
the text of Title VII and fully consistent with its purposes. Whether
recognized as a distinct type of discrimination under Title VII or a
species of disparate impact theory, classification bias offers a way
for rethinking how antidiscrimination law should be tailored to
respond to the unique challenges raised by data-driven forms of
discrimination. Doing so is essential for Title VII’s vision of
workplace equality to continue to advance in the face of evolving
threats.
